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OTHER SIDE OF THE SUMMIT

**More a Pause Than a Pact *Tristram Coffin*
Prague to Moscow, via Peking *Paul Wohl***

'PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL'

Who Owns the Private Governments?

Sen. Lee Metcalf & Vic Reinemer

CENTRIFUGAL TECHNOLOGY

The New Industrial Revolution

John M. Blair

Barbara Wolf:

Yukio Mishima's Testimony

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EDITORIALS

CAMPAIGN '72

'A Sense of Success'

President Nixon launched his campaign for re-election with a free-time televised speech from Moscow at almost the moment, by chance, when he had acquired enough delegates to insure his renomination at Miami. As a major news event the Moscow summit warranted the extensive coverage it was given, but the accomplishments were—perhaps unavoidably—exaggerated. That the agreements are less important than the media made them appear is suggested by *Time's* comment: "as important, in a way, as the agreements was the atmosphere of the summit." That is like saying that the medium is the message. The seriatim release of the agreements, all negotiated well in advance but signed with such pomp and ceremony, created, as Hedrick Smith reported in *The New York Times*, "a sense of success" which was somehow larger than a realistic assessment would warrant. Although the long-term effect of the agreements remains to be seen, they were important and so was the twelve-point declaration of principles and 3,500-word communiqué. But the media projected "a sense of success" which was not fully justified.

To be noted is the fact that President Nixon, contrary to his usual practice, has been strangely reticent in his rhetoric about the Moscow summit. No doubt that is because he too feels that the failure to come up with an agreement on Vietnam casts a shadow on the summit's achievements. The attempt by both sides to place Vietnam in the category of a minor action of little real importance did not square with the caviar and champagne. That neither side would budge had the effect of dimming the accomplishments and of creating an atmosphere in which "a sense of success" had to substitute for the real thing.

One aspect of Nixon's performance requires emphasis. It is now more or less generally conceded that the military threat of the Soviet Union was consistently exaggerated throughout the early years of the cold war. This distortion was accomplished, in no small measure, by what Dr. Alfred G. Meyer, of the University of Michigan's Center for Russian Studies, has termed "a systematic kind of self-deception." It is therefore ironic that Nixon, one of the men most committed to the ideology of the cold war and "anti-communism," should now be engaged in what seems a rather ambitious effort to establish new cooperative relations with the two major Communist powers. A double irony is that these initiatives are being taken at a time when by any reckoning Russia and China are much stronger militarily and otherwise than they were when the cold war began. Much has happened since then, but it should be clear that Nixon approached Peking and Moscow in large part because he realized that time had run out on the "anti-Communist" cold war that he had skillfully, and shamelessly, exploited for so many years.

So what more natural, for him, than that he should decide to campaign as the man who "ended the cold war" which he did so much to set in motion? And a further irony is, as Dr. Meyer notes, that the Soviet politicians with whom he dealt in Moscow are no more revolution-

aries than he is a peacenik; rather they are "stuffy, cautious, conservative bureaucrats" who have always "preferred dealing with conservatives to dealing with rebels or radicals. They seem to feel much more at ease with them."

As Stan Carter reported in the *New York Daily News*, Nixon and Brezhnev "were like two Rotarians getting together." But both men, and the bureaucracies they represent, have too deep an investment in the cold war to end it. As politicians, both have a tactical interest in moderating it—and managing it. But while they could safely agree about medical research, space exploration, pollution, even a limited understanding on strategic weapons, both seemed powerless on Vietnam because each still hopes to win a victory by proxy. System managers they may be; peacemakers they are not—at least on the record to date.

Yet Nixon will certainly turn the "sense of success" at the Moscow summit to excellent political advantage. His TV address was impressive. It was tactful, shrewd, carefully delivered and, with the exception of the political soap-opera touch at the end about Little Tanya—offensively hypocritical in view of the bombs falling in Vietnam—it was a good kickoff for his campaign. Its effectiveness was underscored, of course, by the initial McGovern-Humphrey debate in California which did not brighten Democratic prospects for November. The second debate went better, but the opening round was a near disaster. The format—newsmen questioning two candidates—was better designed to produce confusion than enlightenment. It was a mistake, too, to lift a California primary debate to the level of a national debate on the entire range of issues. Even so, the effect might have been different but for Humphrey's performance, which will do little to restore his reputation. He can trivialize any occasion.

When an incumbent President seeks re-election one basic issue is involved: should he be retained in office for another four years? Presidents are not turned out because a rival candidate offers more attractive programs or projects brighter vistas. The President's record is the prime issue. The Democrats seem to have forgotten this basic consideration. Mr. Nixon has enjoyed a large degree of immunity from effective criticism because of the feuding of Democratic contenders. They have spent big sums (although the party is bankrupt) in the primaries; he has spent little. In Wisconsin he canceled media programs not because exposure was unnecessary or undesirable but to remove himself from the scene, the better to focus a bright light on the quarreling Democrats. Skillfully exploiting the media that he consistently accuses of unfairness, he has managed to get more free television time than any President seeking re-election. He has been an avowed candidate now for some time, yet he continues to present himself as a noncandidate President.

The McGovern-Humphrey sparring about taxes, welfare programs, etc., diverted attention from the statement of Presidential Assistant John Ehrlichman that the President will oppose "any increase in federal taxation for the foreseeable future." Yet the Administration is running an enormous deficit, military expenditures will doubtless increase, commitments for existing programs are outpacing revenues, and inflation is by no means curbed. Not only does Nixon oppose an increase in taxes "in the foreseeable future" but he maintains a remarkable silence on tax

reform. By inference he will, if re-elected, propose the Value Added Tax and start cutting back on social programs; if he loses, the Democrats will inherit the mess. Yet the Democrats have insisted on granting the President almost total immunity on this and other issues. They quarrel and he travels. And time is rapidly running out in which to make, and then hammer home, the case against his record—which, to repeat, is the basic issue. Nor can the Democrats assume that if Nixon is still saddled with the war in November, nothing else will matter. The Moscow spirit, so-called, can hardly fail to alarm the North Vietnamese, and continued efforts to interdict supplies by bombing and the mining of harbors is certain to have some effect. So a cease-fire or settlement of some kind remains a possibility. Even if the war drags on, the ballyhoo about new relations with Moscow and Peking may induce the gullible to believe that Nixon is doing all that he can to end the war. This opens up the dismaying prospect that Nixon might win even if the war were still on. If the Democrats want to end the war they should concentrate on defeating Nixon, not on making debaters' points on issues unrelated to his record. CAREY McWILLIAMS

Other Tanyas

At the end of his address on Soviet television, President Nixon told the harrowing story of 12-year-old Tanya, one of the thousands who perished in the siege of Leningrad. She recorded in the pages of her diary the deaths of eight members of her family, which ended with the words, "All are dead. Only Tanya is left."

"Let us do all that we can," Mr. Nixon said, "to insure that no other children will have to endure what Tanya did and that your children and ours and all the children of the world can live their full lives together in friendship and in peace."

He couched his exhortation in the future tense, and did not include children *now* enduring what Tanya endured. Yet there are thousands or tens of thousands of such children, as Americans can see in shots of Vietnamese refugees on TV almost every evening.

Neil Sheehan reports in *The New York Times* (May 25) that, according to Sen. Edward Kennedy and the staff of his Senate subcommittee on refugees, the renewed fighting in South Vietnam has resulted in 40,000 to 50,000 civilian war casualties, including about 15,000 dead, by the first week in May. If the fighting continues at the present pace, another 40,000 to 50,000 men, women and children will have become casualties by the end of the first week in June, with a similar proportion of dead. These estimates are based on information from U.S. Government sources in South Vietnam. From the same informants we learn that there were 500,000 refugees on the Saigon government rolls when the offensive began at the end of March. New refugees are said to have increased the total of homeless or displaced persons to 1.5 million.

Granted that North Vietnamese military action is responsible for some of these casualties, the fact remains that American air power, and to a lesser extent South Vietnamese air power provided by the United States, is the great killer in both South and North Vietnam, among soldiers and civilians alike. Senator Kennedy's figures

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cover only South Vietnam. We have no idea of the casualties in North Vietnam.

The Kennedy subcommittee staff points out that this new flood of civilian casualties comes at a time when the U.S. civilian aid program in Vietnam is being phased out. Helicopter evacuation of wounded civilians has been "drastically curtailed," together with a parallel reduction in the number of American military hospitals.

All this has wider reference, involving all Americans who are not actively opposed to the continuation of our military activity in the countries of Indochina. We picture ourselves as a nation with "reverence for life," but in practice this reduces to a reverence only for American lives. When U.S. military casualties began to mount, the voices of protest sounded loud and clear. When U.S. military deaths diminished to a mere trickle of a dozen or so a week, Nixon had none of the difficulties that plagued Johnson. As for civilian casualties, with very few exceptions—a few U.S. Government personnel, war correspondents, et al.—they have been Asians. One is forced to the conclusion that great numbers of Americans—possibly a majority—do not think of Asians as people.

The Kleindienst Record

Long pending business tends to be neglected business in the Congress. A current example is the forthcoming Senate debate on the Kleindienst nomination, now approved or recommended by a majority on the Senate Judiciary Committee.

Kleindienst's malodorous performance in the ITT matter should be enough to warrant rejection, but the carefully researched report of the American Civil Liberties Union on his actions as number-two man in the Department of Justice is equally pertinent. The ACLU does not endorse or oppose nominees; it is concerned only with providing a clear record of past actions in the field of civil liberties and civil rights.

In "The Civil Liberties Record of Richard Kleindienst" (May 1972) the ACLU gives Kleindienst a share of credit for Justice Department actions tending to reaffirm constitutionally guaranteed protection of individuals. Thus, testifying on behalf of the department, Kleindienst advocated repeal of the Emergency Detention Act, a part of the Internal Security Act of 1950, providing for incarceration without due process of persons considered security risks in time of national emergency.

It was also a gain for civil liberties when the Justice Department decided against seeking to retry defendants in the Spock case. Last fall, Justice Department testimony hinted at expanding the use of loyalty oaths and security hearings for government employees. Kleindienst has said that he does not advocate such programs.

Kleindienst has repeatedly called for rapid recruitment of black and other minority group policemen and for enlarged minority group representation in the entire field of law enforcement and human relations.

So much for the plus side. An incomplete summary of Justice Department actions which should count against Kleindienst follows. Although there is no way of knowing how large a role he played in any particular situation, he certainly was in a position to influence the outcome.

¶ Advocacy and use of wire tapping and bugging without a court order in "domestic security" cases.

¶ Use of illegally obtained evidence from wire taps and bugs in trials such as that of the "Chicago Seven."

¶ Inclusion of provisions in the Justice Department's D.C. Crime Bill, whereby telephone company personnel, landlords and building custodians are obliged to assist the government in placing wire taps and bugs.

¶ Increasing use of "conspiracy" trials, almost all involving anti-war activists, on charges so broad that their actual purpose seems to be to stifle dissent.

¶ Reduction of efforts in voting rights enforcement.

¶ Opposition to effective extension of the 1965 Voting Rights Act.

¶ Attack on First Amendment protection of freedom of the press—*vide* the Pentagon Papers; the effort to secure an injunction against publication of a book by a former CIA agent; and efforts to compel *New York Times* reporter Earl Caldwell to release confidential notes, tapes and sources.

¶ Use of *agents provocateurs* to build or create cases against left-wing and student activists.

¶ Failure to seek prosecution of those responsible for the killings at Kent State University.

¶ Opposition to strong federal gun control laws.

¶ Pressures on the U.S. Parole Board, which is supposed to make its decisions independently, to reduce the number of paroles that are granted.

¶ Dragnet police tactics, exemplified by arrests of approximately 13,000 persons in Washington during the 1971 Mayday demonstrations.

¶ Conversion of grand juries into tools for political surveillance. During the past year some thirteen grand juries around the country have investigated Left-liberal persons and groups, especially those active in anti-draft, anti-war efforts. Witnesses have been coerced and denied the full protection of the Fifth Amendment through the device of "limited use" immunity.

¶ Efforts by Kleindienst and the Justice Department to seek expanded power for the Subversive Activities Control Board, which had virtually expired until revived by the current Administration.

¶ Use by the Immigration and Naturalization Service, an arm of the Department of Justice, of a form of "arrest," consisting of picking up and detaining people on the ground that they may be in this country illegally.

¶ Narrowing of procedures whereby renowned personalities who are believed to be Communists may visit here.

¶ Advocacy of preventive detention, which denies bail to certain accused persons adjudged likely to commit further crimes if released.

¶ Advocacy of "no-knock" statutes enabling police to enter private premises without identifying themselves.

¶ Provision in the D.C. Crime Bill of a device whereby persons convicted more than once of anything more serious than a nonmoving traffic violation can be sentenced to more than the maximum penalty for their offense, thus converting misdemeanors into felonies.

¶ Making it a crime, through the D.C. Crime Bill, to resist an illegal arrest.

¶ Creation of "special" grand juries to investigate appointed public officials. If the special jury cannot discover

criminal violations, it is empowered to issue critical reports anyway.

¶The Organized Crime Control Act also gives the Attorney General powers similar to the subpoena, heretofore reserved to grand juries. "Dangerous special offenders" may be sentenced to terms of up to twenty-five years, based on "information" provided by the government.

¶Support of legislation which Kleindienst said would permit reopening of every single school desegregation ruling in the nation.

What makes these actions of the Justice Department of particular moment is that, with its new Nixon majority, the Supreme Court can no longer be regarded as a bulwark against erosion of civil liberties. If Kleindienst is confirmed, the way will be opened for an all-out attack on the traditional constitutional guarantees.

That Wild Blue Yonder

The Air Force's propensity for spending is also of the wild blue order. Just now, despite the cordiality emanating from the Moscow summit meetings, the Air Force insists that it needs seven Boeing 747 aircraft for use by top decision makers in the event of a "national emergency"—that is, a full-scale nuclear war. In that dire event the President and his most influential aides would direct operations from flying command posts. A large fleet of aircraft designed and equipped for this purpose is in existence, but the Air Force wants \$261 million as a down payment on bigger flying command posts, with the seven 747s as a start. Three of these would be stationed at Andrews Air Force Base for Presidential use; the other four would be turned over to the Strategic Air Command.

Senator Proxmire suggests (*Congressional Record*, S 7885, May 16) that this proposal is not to fill an actual national security need but to provide the Air Force with luxury housing aloft. In existing EC-135 command posts the available space is about 880 square feet per aircraft. Each 747 would provide 3,400 square feet—a whopping jump. Why not go to less expensive DC-10s or L-1011s at this stage? The total space requirements that have been identified amount to 1,800 square feet. DC-10s and L-1011s provide 2,500 square feet, which would seem to be ample. The argument that a 747 can stay airborne for sixteen hours without refueling, as compared with ten hours for the smaller aircraft, would not seem to carry much weight, since the Air Force has hundreds of tankers available and the whole Strategic Air Force bombing concept is based on refueling en route to targets. And if refueling is a critical factor, how about C-5As, of which the Air Force has eighty-one in its inventory? The C-5A has the same unrefueled endurance as the 747.

Secretary Laird argued that the first four 747s are on the production line, no one else has put up a bid for them, and they are available at \$23 million apiece, while in fiscal 1973 they would cost \$24 million. Senator Proxmire suggested that Boeing's needs were a factor: in fact, all the Secretary said in testimony before the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee was that unemployment in Seattle was not an *overriding* reason for the request.

The most ludicrous Air Force argument, however, was that "the first three aircraft are essential to provide the

operational experience needed to properly define the command, control and communications package to be installed and tested in the fourth aircraft." They haven't got the package, and they assert a need for acquiring three 747s to decide what they will install in the fourth. "Some wild justifications have been offered to Congress for new military programs," Senator Proxmire remarked, "but this one stands alone."

The Real State of the World

Commencement addresses are a special art form in which the speaker, usually a person of worldly eminence, essays to impart wisdom to those graduating. In practice, the addresses are on the pompous side, fat with generalizations and reflecting "the spirit of the times," so that in the depths of the cold war the speakers shellacked the Reds with monotonous insistence. But this year saw a startling exception—Elie Wiesel was chosen as the commencement speaker by the senior class of Manhattanville College at Purchase, N. Y., until recently a Catholic institution for young women.

Nation readers are familiar with Elie Wiesel's work—with one exception, all of his novels have been reviewed in our columns, beginning with a roundup of the five earlier ones in 1966, up to *Souls on Fire* in the issue of March 20, 1972. Wiesel survived his childhood in the death camps of Auschwitz and Buchenwald and, as Laurence Goldstein wrote in the 1966 reviews, the novels "are driven by an ardor that gives form to the terrible passions that play beneath the surface of civilization." Wiesel did not patronize the graduates with a rehash of the conventional wisdom; instead, he tried to impart some of the humanity which grew out of his own dehumanizing experiences.

"I have learned," he said, "that man ultimately must be a link," and he tried to be a link between graduates of the Nazi extermination camps and the college graduates, sitting before him under sunny skies. He did not speak of his experiences in Germany; but he told them why he writes. "My idea in my storytelling," he said, "is to make Jews better Jews, and Christians better Christians, and in general, if possible at all, make man a little warmer, so he will not feel crushed by his own solitude."

The contrast between the setting at Manhattanville and Wiesel's references to the wars in Indochina and North Ireland could not have been missed. The speaker was not pretending that Purchase, in its wealth and decorum, was the world. "I believe," he said, "that never has society been so dehumanized as it is now. Words mean nothing. What is even worse, words of lies come out as words of truth. . . . I pity you, because the world which is not yet ready to receive you is full of horrors, full of violence, full of absurdity." And, with characteristic modesty: "There are no answers to true questions. There are only good questions, painful sometimes, exuberant at other times. Whatever I have learned in my life is questions. And whatever I have tried to share with friends is questions."

The citation which accompanied Wiesel's honorary degree read: "To a world flooded with the tenuous reality of facts, you celebrate the truth and magic of man's imagination, of his awesome power to tell stories." Much truth was spoken on that Memorial Day at Manhattanville.

OTHER SIDE OF THE SUMMIT

1. More a Pause Than a Pact

TRISTRAM COFFIN

Mr. Coffin, editor of the newsletter Washington Watch, is currently at work on a study of the Presidency.

Washington

The media, which have been consistently criticized as unfair by the Nixon Administration, are presenting the Moscow summit in even brighter hues than those used by official spokesmen. The rude fact is that Nixon and Brezhnev barely stirred the dust. The meeting was a stiff and staged ritual, the primary immediate impact of which is to bolster the domestic fortunes of the two super-bureaucrats. Neither of the principals seemed aware of the black humor of their champagne toasts while American bombers murdered the innocent in Vietnam.

At best, the arms agreement is a moment's uneasy and confused relaxation for two nations exhausted economically by the fantastic overkill they have piled up. Yet, as *The New York Times* points out, "Even before the signing ceremony, Defense Secretary Melvin Laird issued an appeal for this country to go ahead developing a new long-range submarine missile system to replace the older weapons the United States now has in operation."

The limit of two ABM sites simply recognizes a scientific fact—the ABM is too costly, too complex and too unreliable; at this point, to spend a nickel on. What is surprising is that the United States and Russia are willing to invest in 200 ABMs. This seems to be a sop to the hawks and arms makers. Russia's ABM technology is said to be far behind ours, and can be overwhelmed by multiple warheads and other American gadgets.

The freeze on offensive missiles is the kind of agreement a harassed schoolteacher would enforce on two boys fighting in the hall: give each a little taste of victory and send them home to rest up for the next bout. The pause is more psychological than real. The accord is so filled with confusing language, technical interpretations and loopholes that either the United States or Russia can go back into the business of creating weapons of mass extermination; there is no bar, for example, on orbiting missile systems.

The *Times* says: "In effect, the agreements match off the size of the Soviet arsenal against the technological superiority of the American arsenal, preserving the strategic parity that both sides feel they have achieved." At the end of this year, the United States will have 5,700 nuclear warheads to the Soviet's 2,500. Our bag is exclusive of the nuclear weapons available to the U.S. Air Force units in NATO. Also, we have the devastating MIRV or multiple warhead which strews nuclear destruction so widely that there is no defense.

Russia is allowed to keep its numerical superiority in missiles, 2,328, to our 1,710. The numbers of warheads and missiles is a kind of mathematical gibberish, for both sides have enough power and dispersion to absolutely destroy the other many times over. What is needed for world

safety is, first, an absolute freeze, then an agreement to destroy nuclear stockpiles and missiles.

The emptiness of the agreement is shown by Secretary Laird's new push for ULMS. This is a giant submarine whose cost is reckoned at anywhere from \$39.5 billion to \$100 billion, and the only sensible reason advanced for it is to help out the two major contractors, Lockheed and General Dynamics.

The Navy now has forty-one Polaris submarines with a sea life of about thirty years. At the end of the year, twelve Polaris vessels will be armed with the super Poseidon missile; it will have a 2,500-mile range and ten to fourteen warheads. A new guidance system doubles the accuracy of the A-2 and A-3 missiles on the twenty-nine other Polaris ships. The underwater fleet will have a megaton force 10,000 times that of the blows that hit Japan. By the late 1970s, Polaris will be fitted with a missile of 4,500-to-5,000-mile range. Despite this enormous power, the Administration wants ULMS. It would carry twenty-four instead of sixteen missile launch tubes, missiles with a 6,000-mile radius, seventeen multiple warheads and, according to Pentagon testimony, "various features designed to make it difficult for ABMs to shoot it down." From any station, ULMS could zero in on Russia; that is what is known in military argot as an "omni-azimuthal threat."

The so-called threat to the Polaris is the Soviet Y-class submarine, with a shorter cruising and missile range. However, Rear Adm. Levering Smith, director of Navy Strategic Systems Projects, said in 1969: "I am also quite positive that the new generation of Russian submarines that are getting close to the operational status, that are now being tested, will not be able to follow our Polaris submarine."

So, if under the Moscow agreement, the United States can still go ahead with ULMS, it hardly seems worth the champagne the Russians provided.

There are other parts to the Moscow package.

¶Trade: *The Washington Post* says editorially: "The summit announcement on trade is a bust. . . . The United States and the Soviet Union seem to have done nothing more than establish a commission to, as the Russians put it, 'promote the development of mutually advantageous relations in trade.' None of the known knotty issues was resolved; not the Soviet lend-lease debt, not American credits, not terms of American investment in Soviet projects, not the matter of giving Soviet goods fair access to the American market, not procedures for doing business, not the settlement of trade disputes. . . . No new big trading deals were announced, or even targeted."

¶Scientific and technological cooperation in a number of areas: The American spokesman admitted, "At the present time we have only defined the general subject matter." *The Christian Science Monitor* notes, "The Nixon Administration's record on international pollution makes

environmentalists highly skeptical. The last bilateral environmental agreement—a clear-water pact signed with Canada—was roundly criticized as a showcase event which committed no additional American money and ducked the phosphate-detergent problem. In two other areas specifically mentioned in the American-Soviet cooperation—supersonic air transports and Arctic petroleum pipelines—the Nixon Administration already has rejected the pleadings of most environmentalists and some affected nations.”

¶Cooperation in space will make good TV spectaculars. The great omission at Moscow was an agreement on Indochina, either open or under the table. Nixon’s gamble that he could twist the Russians’ arms and stop supplies to

Hanoi failed, as almost anyone who reads the papers could tell him. Soviet Russia, itself an Asian power locked in a frantic (and that is the exact word for it) competition with China, can’t afford to back out on Hanoi, and give China on a platter political dominance over the nationalist movements of South Asia. When the United States withdraws its guns and planes and ships, as it eventually will, there will be a mighty scramble to accommodate to the remaining big powers. Thailand is already talking on the sly with the Chinese. India and Russia have a close understanding. Aside from this, Russia has no compelling reason for the war to end. It keeps America bleeding, and it maintains a powerful military threat to China from the south.

So what does Nixon do next? □

2. Prague to Moscow, via Peking

PAUL WOHL

Mr. Wohl is the Communist affairs and Soviet specialist of The Christian Science Monitor.

Czechoslovakia’s sad fate has once again brought the great powers to a turning point. In 1938-39 the occupation of that landlocked little country in the heart of central Europe changed the international balance of power and ultimately led to war. Thirty years later, when tanks rolled out of Soviet planes into the streets of Prague, the occupation of Czechoslovakia started another realignment of the great powers. This realignment, highlighted by President Nixon’s

visits to Peking and Moscow, may be a turn toward peace.

Moscow’s attempt to browbeat Czechoslovakia’s “communism with a human face” and, ultimately, the Warsaw Pact’s military intervention, produced a deep shock in Peking. The so-called Brezhnev doctrine, which made it a duty for Communist-ruled countries to intervene against anything that Moscow might term counterrevolutionary, theoretically could be applied to Maoist China. Peking feared that, if not China, then one or another Chinese province might suffer the fate of Czechoslovakia.

In the best Marxist-Leninist manner, Mao’s analysts



saw the occupation of Czechoslovakia in a larger context. On September 16, 1968, the Chinese Government presented a note to the Soviet chargé d'affaires, stating: "The aggression against Czechoslovakia is part of a global strategy by which the Soviet Government, through an alliance with the United States directed against China, seeks to gain world domination. . . ." On September 20, *People's Daily* of Peking wrote: "If the Soviet revisionists were capable of mobilizing some member countries [of the Warsaw Pact] in order to commit an aggression against another member of the pact, what could prevent them from . . . another aggression against a member of the Socialist commonwealth?"

A few months later, Peking was even more blunt. On March 21, 1969, *New China* asked: "If the Soviet revisionists can apply the theory of international dictatorship . . . under the pretext of 'defending common interests,' what can keep them from finding new pretexts in order to apply this doctrine to other countries?" It was at that time that Peking began to accuse Moscow of "social imperialism, social colonialism and social fascism," and that was the year when major fighting flared up at various points of the Sino-Soviet border. By November, the Soviet Union had become China's enemy number one and China the enemy number one of the Soviet Union.

Toward the end of 1968, despite official talk about Soviet-American collusion, China began to veer toward a rapprochement with the United States. On November 26, 1968, Peking suggested to Washington a treaty on peaceful coexistence. The offer to conclude such a treaty was turned down with Washington's perennial argument: propaganda. In this particular case reversion to the terminology of the John Foster Dulles era made sense, since Radio Peking and Radio Tirana had only a few weeks earlier accused the United States of cooperating secretly with the Russians. Moreover, Washington's refusal to take up Peking's offer was not the end of the affair. Privately, Peking was given to understand that Washington wanted proof of China's wish to realign its policies.

Peking complied and began serious talks with Sweden

about an exchange of ambassadors. In January 1969, Italy announced its intention to recognize Peking, an overture Rome would hardly have made without clearing with Washington. There were other developments in this direction.

Early in 1969, as Dr. Henry Kissinger has disclosed, Peking and Washington began to exchange secret messages. The Soviets, who must have gotten wind of this traffic, now also sought to improve their relations with the United States. Not content with approaches on the diplomatic level, Moscow appealed publicly to the West for support against China.

"The Soviet Union's eastern border is not only the border between the Soviet Union and China but between bellicose Maoism and Western civilization," wrote Soviet publicist G. Dadiants in the French daily *Le Monde* on April 2, 1969. As fighting in the Far East became more intense, the Kremlin's poet laureate, Yevgeny Yevtushenko, chimed in. Moscow began to encourage Bonn's *Ostpolitik* and even dropped its hostility toward the European Common Market.

All this time negotiations between Peking and Washington progressed. Ultimately, the American President visited both Peking and Moscow.

Relations among the great powers changed more radically between 1968 and 1972 than they did in the five years after Stalin. Just as in 1938-39, there has been a full turn in world affairs and, once again, it was triggered off by the sad fate of Czechoslovakia.

Actually this was the third time that a major political tremor originated in Czechoslovakia. When the Communists took over in Prague in 1948 and the liberal Benes republic which sought to be a bridge between East and West was replaced by a Stalinist dictatorship, the cold war went into high gear.

Ironically the objective of the Warsaw Pact intervention in 1968 was to keep out Western ideas and to restrict the Communist bloc's relations with the outside world, which may be exactly the opposite of what the new triangular alignment—Peking-Washington-Moscow—could bring about. □

'PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL'

Who Owns the Private Governments?

SEN. LEE METCALF and VIC REINEMER

Senator Metcalf is the junior Senator from Montana. Mr. Reinemer is his executive secretary. They are joint authors of Overcharge: How the Electric Utilities Exploit and Mislead the Public and What You Can Do About It, published by McKay, 1967.

Sen. James Couzens of Michigan used to say that whoever held 2 or 3 per cent of the stock of a corporation could usually get "the majority to do the wishes of the minority." He spoke from experience half a century ago as president of the Bank of Detroit and a director of Detroit Trust. Rep. Wright Patman's House Banking Subcommittee on

Domestic Finance considers 5 per cent significant when judging the potential influence that a bank trust department's stockholding may have on a particular corporation, but emphasizes that "even 1 or 2 per cent of stock in a publicly held corporation can gain tremendous influence over a company's policies and operations." Because common stock is widely held, an institution with only a small percentage may nevertheless be the biggest stockholder. Control can be exercised through interlocking directorates or credit policy. The most fundamental control is through voting of stock, thereby selecting the corporations' leadership and setting the general policy, as in a government election.

The American public knows a great deal about the voting constituencies of New Hampshire, Florida, Wisconsin, Maryland and other states where Presidential primaries have been held. The voters in these states have been canvassed, analyzed, photographed, interviewed, and polled. In contrast, no one knows much about who votes stock in the superstates—the major corporations whose wealth and power rival that of national governments—except the people who vote it. They don't brag publicly about the number of proxies they cast. They don't volunteer much hard information and not much is dug out by others. In fact, no one has even publicly identified the voters in the multibillion-dollar corporations whose decisions dwarf, in political, economic, environmental and social consequence, actions taken by individual states or even the Congress.

The men who cast the ballots in the superstates can check on you. They determine your financial situation from a retail credit data bank, your medical condition from an insurance industry computer. But you can't check on them. And neither their tail-wagging regulators nor the leaderless little antitrust division of the Justice Department can give you a list of the key voters in Corporation X. The \$126 million Justice Department-FBI edifice going up on Pennsylvania Avenue is destined to house the records of millions of individuals, but not of Fortune's 500 corporations.

There are enough data available to show that the list of key voters in major companies is not very long, and that some of them cast millions of votes in many constituencies. One source is the Securities and Exchange Commission Institutional Investors' Study Report, which the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce printed last year as House Document 92-64.

Part Five of the study analyzed concentration of stockholdings of the 230 largest institutional investors—bank trust departments, investment houses, insurance companies, employee benefit plans, educational endowments and foundations. They hold about three-fourths of all corporate share holdings. The companies in which stock is held—the 800 companies listed with the New York and American Stock Exchanges or traded exclusively over the counter—are named in the study, although their institutional investors are not.

The tables in the SEC report show the number of institutional investors which hold and vote various percentages of stock in each company. In some cases the institutional investors have only partial voting rights, but in many instances they have exclusive voting rights—and enough of them to get “the majority to do the wishes of the minority,” as Senator Couzens put it, with plenty of proxies to spare.

Procter & Gamble has an institutional investor who can cast at least 10 per cent of the votes. So do Gulf Oil, Ford and Northwest Industries. Texaco's unknown voter controls at least 15 per cent of the votes. The big boy behind Sears Roebuck has at least 20 per cent. Some of these big blocks are employee benefit funds, and it is pertinent here to say that banks have sole voting rights in 81.5 per cent of the 11,087 such funds surveyed by the Patman subcommittee.

From one to three institutional investors have sole

voting rights for at least 10 per cent of the stock in more than one-fourth of the companies in the SEC study that have a stock market value exceeding \$15 million. This category includes another oil company, Standard of Indiana, and an auto company, Chrysler. It includes six airlines—Eastern, TWA, United, National, Delta and Northwest, plus Boeing. There are Holiday Inns and Hilton Hotels, Upjohn, Parke Davis and A. H. Robins, Aetna Life and Casualty, Hartford Fire Insurance, Connecticut General Insurance and Farmers New World Life, Collins Radio and Lafayette Radio, Benrus Watch and General Time, Fairchild Camera and Polaroid, Avon Products and Revlon, Control Data Corporation and Sperry Rand, Celanese, and Syntex, Xerox, Textron, Sunbeam, International Paper, Reynolds Tobacco, Loew's Theatres, National Steel, Freeport Sulphur, Colt Industries, Hercules, Grand Union and Ideal Toy, among many others.

The SEC study documents the concentration of economic power, at a level above that of company officials, but it doesn't show where the power lies. Nor does it show how many companies are subject to control by one institutional investor. That information is basic to achieving law and order in the antitrust field, especially if one or two of these unknown voters dominate an industry, such as the commercial airlines.

There is not much point in telling people to work for change “within the system” if they can't find out who the system is. So we asked the SEC to send over the names of the thirty top stockholders of major corporations. Chairman Casey of SEC responded that the information was not required to be filed with the Commission and did not volunteer to try to obtain it. We therefore used the direct approach, and put the query to the presidents of the nine largest industrial corporations of America. Three of them are oil companies—Standard of New Jersey, Texaco and Mobil—and three are car manufacturers—General Motors, Ford and Chrysler. The others are IBM, General Electric and ITT.

Texaco replied that the stockholders, information was “privileged and confidential.” GM said that “it is our policy not to disclose specific information concerning individual stockholders, as such individuals or organizations may regard their holdings as a matter that is private to them.”

Standard of New Jersey used the “third party” excuse: “We regard the relationship between the Company and the shareholder as a private one, somewhat like that between a bank and its depositors, and, in the absence of some legal requirements, would not wish to be guilty of disclosing a shareholder's private affairs for the purposes of third parties. Normally, of course, third party inquiries arise out of marital difficulties, creditors' claims, or just plain curiosity of, say, a relative or a newspaper columnist.”

IBM doesn't even trust the second party, the stockholders, with such basic information about themselves: “The By-laws of our corporation restrict the availability of this type of information even to our own stockholders.”

ITT neglected to respond until a follow-up letter was sent along with the other responses, after they appeared

in the April 25th *Congressional Record*. But ITT had been busy, and the first letter may even have been shredded. In declining to divulge, ITT said: "I am sure you understand that in view of their confidentiality, it would represent a breach of our fiduciary responsibility to stockholders if we were to disclose their shareholdings without their consent, unless of course it were pursuant to a statutory or legal requirement."

But the other four companies, to their credit, supplied the requested information. True, some of the ownership was hidden behind street names or nominees—those phantom companies that are nothing more than post office boxes of the banks and other institutions which use the dummies to hide their concentrated power. But it is possible to find who the nominee fronts are by using the Nominee List, published and at last publicly available from the American Society of Corporate Secretaries in New York.

The data reported by the four companies showed that banks dominate the top stockholders and that the New York Stock Exchange itself, operating under the nominee "Cede and Company," is a significant stockholder. The thirty top stockholders in Chrysler hold 41 per cent of its common stock. The banks included in the top thirty and the Exchange account for 39 per cent of Chrysler's total stock. Ford's top thirty hold 35 per cent of the total common stock, with the banks and Exchange accounting for 33 per cent. Comparable figures for GE are 21 per cent and 19.6 per cent, and for Mobil 28 and 26 per cent.

While we did not ask and do not know precisely how much of this stock is subject to complete voting control by the stockholder, studies by the House Banking and Currency Committee show that most of the stock held

by banks is voted by them. Members of the New York Stock Exchange can vote its "Cede and Company" holdings under certain conditions.

The "top thirty" stockholders are in some cases actually the top twenty or so, because of the practice of institutional investors, amazingly allowed by regulators, of hiding holdings through multiple nominees. [See Metcalf and Reinemer: "Unmasking Corporate Ownership," *The Nation*, July 19, 1971.] Thus to use examples, involving five of the largest banks based in New York, General Electric included among its top thirty stockholders Barnett & Co., Eddy & Co. and Salkeld & Co., all of which are pseudonyms for Bankers Trust. Chrysler listed Kane & Co., Cudd & Co. and Egger & Co., all of which translate to Chase Manhattan. Ford listed Gerlach & Co., Stuart & Co., Thomas & Co. and King & Co., all of which are nominees for First National City Bank. Mobil listed Carson & Co., Kelly & Co., Reing & Co. and Shaw & Co., all of them nominees for Morgan Guaranty Trust.

The concentration spreads horizontally as well as vertically. Sigler & Co. is listed as a principal stockholder by all four of the companies which divulged holdings. Call Manhattan telephone information and the girl will tell you she doesn't have a listing for Sigler & Co., or any of the other nominees. But Sigler & Co. is actually a post office drop for the bank empire built by Peter Flanigan's father, Manufacturers Hanover Trust.

So the pyramid of power tops at the banks and New York Stock Exchange, among persons unidentified. Those are the voters who must be lifted from low profile to sharp silhouette. Change within the system is possible only in an open society, in which the people know where the power lies and whom to petition for redress of grievances. □

Torture: Implement of Conformity

PIERRE VIDAL-NAQUET

The following is an authorized translation of the conclusion of La Torture dans la République by Pierre Vidal-Naquet: Editions de Minuit. A revised and expanded version of the book, under the title, Torture, Cancer of Democracy, appeared in England in 1963. There was an Italian edition in the same year, but the book was never published in France.

When this book comes out, ten years will have elapsed since the end of the Algerian War. History no doubt provides few directly serviceable "lessons," but there is no reason why a citizen, even a historian, should not reflect upon it. My only excuse then, if one be needed, will be to do so briefly.

At first glance nothing would appear to be more remote from our present frame of mind than the Algerian tragedy. Particularly, the practice of torture seems to have played no role of any kind in the political debates—in the usual sense of this word—that have occupied the front of the stage for the last ten years. Generally speaking, the amnesty was accepted. Of the officers who were most deeply involved in the repressive apparatus, some have

left the army, either for reasons of age or because the officers' corps has been reduced, or again because they were implicated in the OAS. Others, on the contrary, have continued their careers quite normally. In no case, apparently, has the fact that they used torture played a role in their fates, at least not officially. The brilliant career of General Massu bears witness to this fact.* And what is true of the military is true also of the police. Indeed, the attitude of the electorate toward politicians does not seem to have depended in any way on their moral or political conduct during the "Algerian Years." It has not hurt François Mitterrand's position that he was Minister of Justice in the Mollet government; Max Lejeune is vice president of the Socialist group in the National Assembly; Robert Lacoste is a senator, Michel Debré heads a ministry; the former prefect of police, Maurice Papon, is a deputy and member of an official

* In 1966, a new military regulation gave a soldier the possibility of refusing to obey an immoral order. It would be interesting to read what General Massu who, at the time, was Commander in Chief of the French Army of Occupation in Germany, had to say on the subject.

mission to China. Within both the opposition and majority groups there have undoubtedly appeared a certain number of new faces, but this is due at least as much to the succession of generations as to any condemnation of previous "errors." Sometimes you ask yourself if those events really took place.

One of the most tragic episodes of the war, the anti-Algerian pogrom of October 17, 1961, seems to have been entirely erased from the collective conscience of Parisians; not only does the most important history of the Algerian War, that by Yves Courrière, entirely overlook it but not one of the May-June 1968 handbills, which mention so many events of contemporary history on all five continents, alludes to it. The phenomenon is the more remarkable because the men who represent the "Algerian generation" today play a leading role in the life and leadership of the country. This situation is so striking that it is legitimate to ask if the books that give such a soothing and falsely serene version of the facts are not being especially written for such men; if these versions of history are what make possible the kind of televised "free dialogue" we were treated to between Colonel Trinquier and the NLF leader, Yacef Saadi—along, it is true, with censorship of the film *The Battle of Algiers*, which itself, however, is not very unlike this reassuring account of the facts. Even the publication of General Massu's book gave rise to only rather sporadic reactions, and the controversy that followed took place principally among war veterans. When extracts from Yves Courrière's book on the April 1961 *Putsch* of the Generals appeared in *Le Monde*, they provoked much greater controversy than had the defense of torture.

We should have to let matters stand there, being content to take note of the facts, if France and the whole of Occidental society had really settled down—as they seemed to be doing—into the delights of a so-called consumer society more closely resembling Aldous Huxley's description in *Brave New World* than the totalitarian world of 1984. But, one fine day in 1968, we realized that this was not true.

Does it follow that we are obliged to consider the question of torture? During the Algerian years this method of interrogation and punishment was used in an attempt to subdue the dissidence of a colonized population that was trying to throw off total domination by another, modern population. It is possible to indulge in endless bitter speculation as to the importance that this or that factor played in the adoption of these methods. If the Algerians had not been dramatically poor, if they had not been Arab victims of racist contempt, it is probable that the phenomenon of "torture" would not have increased so impressively. But the most elementary analysis of the parallels shows that the Algerians were tortured simply because a certain number of them did not accept the position they had been forced into, and so revolted. Of course, some were tortured before the 1954 rebellion, but they also were suspected of not fully accepting the French colonial system, with all that it implied. From Kenya to Cyprus, from Vietnam to Ireland, the same thing has happened or is happening.

In the 1950s, a large minority of colonists in Kenya,



Jusp, Wir Burckenbauer (Switzerland)

confronted with a revolt symbolized by the Mau-Mau and by the political action of Jomo Kenyatta's nationalists, played a part similar to that of the Algerian *pieds noirs*. No such group existed in Cyprus, and yet before accords were concluded in January 1959 between the Greeks, the Turks and the British, the EOKA revolt witnessed the evolution of a process exactly parallel to the one that had been seen in Algeria: the same "emergency" measures, the same collective repression, the same use, with all due allowances, of torture. Since there were no British *pieds noirs* in Cyprus, the Turkish community on the island, the majority of whom are poorer than the Greek community, was used by the occupying power as a coercive group against the revolt. Nor were there any *pieds noirs* in Vietnam or in Cambodia, where the American "occupant" has pitted first Vietnamese, then Cambodians, against the Vietnamese, and vice versa.

In the Irish affair, which is still taking place, and once more with all due allowances, one sees the same methods and the same oppressive community, i.e., the Orange Order (representing certainly a minority on the island, though a majority in Ulster). For torture to be applied (not at the level, of course, of the torture used in Algeria) it was only necessary that a fraction of the Catholic minority should revolt. Thereafter, nothing, not even the indignation of a good part of British opinion, could prevent the inexorable evolution of the rules of "revolutionary warfare." Inexorable? Nothing in history, and this bears repeating, is ever fated; it is always possible for men, even those responsible for a repressive action, to show imagination. It is simply that, almost inevitably, the easiest, most elementary, most repetitive actions are the ones most likely to be applied. The example of Greece under the colonels shows that the mere possibility of a revolutionary war—in this case, nonexistent—sufficed to set in motion the mechanism of police repression. Under those conditions, it is not hard to imagine where and how a process similar to the one outlined above could be set in motion in France.

"The other person," that is to say, the person who tomorrow is capable of an unpredicted revolt, is not far off: not only does the Third World start in the suburbs, to quote Alain Geismar, but to be "the other person" you need not even belong to the Third World. It can

TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION

Maria Jolas

Peoples, like individuals, are haunted by the crimes they commit, and it is hard to predict when, or as a result of what current, apparently dead coals will burst into flames of remorse. The brief flare-up of self-accusation in France toward the end of the Franco-Algerian War had seemed to be definitively extinguished; the 1 million *pièdes noirs* had been more or less successfully absorbed, there was little speculation as to what actually remained in the national consciousness. For several years the Italian-Algerian-made film, *La Bataille d'Alger*, had been officially banned. The subject would not be reopened, the page was turned.

Then suddenly, last winter, it was reopened, and by no mere subordinate; the fat was in the fire. A book by the swashbuckling parachute commander, Gen. Jacques Massu himself, broke the silence. ("As much of a *con* as ever, Massu?") is how de Gaulle is supposed to have greeted him one day; to which Massu, always the faithful liege, is quoted as having replied: "As much of a Gaullist as ever, *mon Général*.")

The perpetrators of this catalyzing event—the old publishing house of Plon—had left no stone unturned. They knew the ropes, the terrain, blackjacking tactics that guarantee a best-seller: among others, three prime-time interviews on state television, with the graying general in the role of *grandpère* explaining to the kiddies that all this talk about "torture" was poppycock; that of course he himself hadn't actually applied torture, but that he had countenanced it as an essential weapon in the handling of subversive, guerrilla-type actions.

The sluices are now wide open. Not only *La Bataille d'Alger* but a second, more ambitious documentary film, *La Guerre d'Algérie*, damning to many who are still in public life, is playing to packed houses. The newsstands are selling a widely advertised patriotic account in full color. Gen. Jacques Pâris de Bollardièrre who, as early as 1957, broke with Massu's torture program and, in 1961, tendered his resignation to de Gaulle, has just brought out his memoirs. Another former officer, the *pièd noir*, Jules Roy, has published an emotional indictment entitled *L'accuse le Général Massu*. Finally, in Algeria itself, the discussion would appear to have given rise to reactions of "emotion and irritation" (*Le Monde*, April 27), and the leading Arab historian, Brahimi Mohammed El Mili, is quoted as ending an implacable indictment of the former colonial power, on the following question: "Are we to understand that the world cannot get excited about war crimes when their victims are Arabs?"

But the most profound and most widely discussed analysis of the moral and political implications of these crimes is contained in *La Torture dans la République*, by the historian, Pierre Vidal-Naquet, whose other books on the conduct of the Algerian War, *L'affaire Audin*, 1958; *La Raison d'Etat*, 1962, are essential tools for chroniclers of that none too glorious page in French history. Although the context of this expanded and revised version of a 1963 text remains French, it is impossible not to recognize that the problem the author poses is far from being exclusively French, but is one that will have to be faced with much agonizing reappraisal by any society in which a colonial or even a domestic "confrontation-repression" mechanism is allowed to become the conditioned reflex of an all-powerful, self-serving elite. Today, when U.S. action in Indochina has assumed maniacal proportions, and 1968 is still a running sore in the West, Vidal-Naquet's chilling demonstration holds a warning that none can ignore.

suffice to be imprisoned—or young. The opinion of prison guards or of "decent people" will carry more weight than the laws of the penal code or those of humanity. Without even citing the countless cases of police brutality, certain of which took on the character of torture, and which have been made public since 1968, it is enough to note that after the dance-hall fire in Saint Laurent-du-Pont (November 1, 1970) the Mayor of that little town in the Isère Department made a point of stating on television that the young victims were not from the region—as had been proved by several police raids. That, no doubt, was considered sufficient reason for them to be burned alive.

Any society that feels threatened by dissidence—and that is how our society feels—will find, if not today, then tomorrow, the sporadic or systematic use of torture perfectly tolerable. However, a historical analysis that was content to note the fact would be unusually meager; in particular, it would have failed to take into account another phenomenon of our times, summarized somewhat inaccurately as Stalinism. A certain conception of social conservatism is not the only thing that can lead a government to use torture; a certain conception of social revolution will take the same course. The problem goes well beyond the classical one of victims becoming executioners, because they have been transformed from game into game wardens (contemporary France, Israel, and Algeria since it became independent, offer numerous examples of this mutation). It would be reassuring, but wrong, thus to associate torture with social conservatism. Anyone who has really considered the origins of Stalinism knows otherwise. Indeed, as regards revolutionary militants, the same question could be asked, in almost the same words, as was asked about a young St. Cyr graduate, who had been reared on the picture-book image of the French Army, not to mention the Resistance. (A young lieutenant who had participated in the *Putsch*, was on trial. A fellow officer, Captain Estoup, who had also taken part in the *Putsch*, had the courage to ask the judges of the Military Court the following question: "How can it happen that a brilliant young St. Cyr cadet, one of the outstanding young men of his class . . . today stands accused before a military court? What has happened? Who is responsible for this situation? . . ." Captain Estoup continued: "I hereby state on oath, that . . . like hundreds of his fellow officers, [he] was ordered to get information by the use of torture. . . .")

How does it happen that militants, chosen because of their exceptional revolutionary "purity," can become advocates of torture and organizers of mass murder? (One recalls that the first man to head the Tcheka, Felix Dzerzhinski, was named to that position precisely because of his purity.) The answer is all but evident: they perform actions, not out of personal sadism—many of them appear to be entirely devoid of it—but because they are ideologically convinced that they are right; or rather, they believe themselves to be the depositaries of Right (Reason). They see themselves as the bearers of *Reason in History*, to cite a Hegelian title. This phenomenon is complex, and requires more searching analysis, on several planes, than I can give it here. Today, an important, very active current of thought is based on a theory that may be roughly summarized as follows: ide-

ology is essentially a mask with which men replace an impossible, all-embracing science, and which allows them, first, *not to see* anything that does not enter into the analytical schema proposed by this ideology; and then, under shelter of the mask, to satisfy the murderous instincts that each of us harbors within himself. This proposition, which can be readily exposed as itself an ideology (how many former Stalinists have merely replaced Stalin, or what they thought was Stalin, by Freud, or what they think is Freud!), is not my own.

Ideology or not, I refuse, for instance, to place on an equal footing a current of universalist thought such as Marxism, and a doctrine founded on the primacy of race or nation. But to say that in no way prevents one from asking why it is possible to torture people in the name, if need be, of Islam or Judaism or—as once in the name of Christianity—the thought of Marx or Mao. The very conception of a revolutionary party that is the sole depository of state truth, provides the first element of a reply. Warnings in that context have been frequent since the criticisms launched in 1904 against Lenin by the youthful Trotsky and Rosa Luxemburg. But beyond the idea of a revolutionary party—that is, of a group in which truth is invested—is the idea of revolution itself, whose instruments these groups claim to be.

I might perhaps propose the following axiom: any apocalyptic conception of revolution, that is, any conception of the millenary type which holds in principle that

an absolutely bad state has been suddenly followed by an absolutely good one—whether it be after the “July lightning,” described by Michelet, after the insurrection of the Petrograd proletariat, or after the “Great Cultural Proletarian Revolution”—any conception built on that is constituted to encourage the appearance of a torture state. The context may be different, but the results will be very close to those that characterized French Algeria. The “classless” society is a concept that can legitimately appear as the zenith of history, but as soon as it is transformed into a myth—the myth of the “end of history”—it produces all the consequences to be found in utopian myths when their bearers come to power. The result is that a revolutionary group which does not accept as a first element of its analyses the possibility that it may be challenged, even replaced, is liable tomorrow to become the nucleus of a repressive state. It follows that a vision of a future society that does not institutionally provide for the free possibility of challenge, however radical, can favor development of a new form of repressive state. And it should be made clear that by “free possibility” something more is meant here than the mere written guarantee of formal freedoms. It is this something that modern society and modern revolutionary thinking has yet to invent, but which they will have to invent, or resign themselves to witnessing an infernal cycle of cloying, spectator society and tragic world of torture state, succeeding, often coexisting with, each other. □

CENTRIFUGAL TECHNOLOGY

THE NEW INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION

JOHN M. BLAIR

Dr. Blair was the author of the Temporary National Economic Committee monograph on technology (1941). As chief economist for the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, he directed in 1968 hearings that contained, in Part 6, an examination of New Technologies and Concentration. The following article is derived from his Economic Concentration: Structure, Behavior and Public Policy, published this month by Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.

New decentralizing technologies, by reducing the amount of capital required to go into business, are lowering the barriers to entry and making possible a lower degree of concentration in the economy and less centralism in social and political institutions. Pushing in the same direction are other centrifugal forces, principal among them being the wastefulness inherent in trying to manage huge corporate structures and the apparent inability of such enterprises to provide the milieu or incentives necessary for inventive creativity.

Operating in the opposite direction are centripetal forces, among which are mergers and acquisitions (particularly conglomerate mergers), the influence of television advertising, the continued use of monopolistic and predatory practices by large firms, and the increasing willingness of

the state to shore up weakening private controls of the market. No one can forecast the outcome of these two opposing sets of forces, but the implication is that the long-term trend toward more bigness and greater centralization need not be taken as inevitable. If that trend continues, it will be only because public policy has allowed the centripetal to overbear the centrifugal effects.

The foundations of any economy are its sources of power, types of materials, methods of fabrication and means of transportation. In each of these areas the technological explosion touched off by the Industrial Revolution required increases in plant and company size on a scale never before imagined. Up to the invention of the steam engine, industry had relied on water wheels as its major source of power. The slow movement of the big wheels and the small amount of power they generated imposed severe limitations upon the size of plants. With the introduction of steam, however, power in infinitely greater quantities could be created and transmitted by pulleys and belt lines over a much larger floor space. Moreover, steam greatly increased the speed with which industrial machinery could be operated, and that in turn made possible new types of cutting and drilling machinery.

Just as the substitution of steam for water gave a powerful impetus to centralization, so the substitution of steel

for wood provided a new material that could be fabricated most efficiently in relatively large plants. With steam turning the wheels of industry and steel providing a uniform, consistent and durable material, highly specialized machines and processes were developed to take advantage of the opportunities for mass production. The "continuous process," requiring enormous capital outlays, was introduced in steel, glass, paper and other materials industries. These and similar mechanical improvements raised the number of stages of production that could be conducted in a single plant, requiring larger capital investment and contributing in one way or another to the trend toward large-scale operations.

While the Industrial Revolution was transforming the industrial process, a similar revolution was taking place in transportation, as the railroad replaced the canal, the wagon and the oxcart. Materials taken from a few large deposits moved along inflexible routes to increasingly congested terminal centers, drawing with them population and manufacturing enterprise. The world's important markets, if not there already, necessarily came to be located along the railroad routes.

Since the Industrial Revolution, the steady increase in plant size has seemed to convey the inevitable prospect of monopoly. The question plaguing economists has been, in D. H. Robertson's phrase, whether the process could "be played upon by the mind" without abandoning the theory of competition. The noted German economist Walter Eucken commented on the long-prevailing point of view:

According to the old widely spread and influential view, modern technical progress demands giant units, destroys small and medium-sized enterprises, and it gives rise to an imminent conflict between the size of the plant, the rigidity of supply and the changing requirements to which production cannot be adapted any longer. To maintain economic order it would be necessary to have holding companies, trusts, cartels and other monopolies, state intervention, public corporations. . . . This is the picture most people hold.

The effect of these new technologies on the mind of man has, if anything, proved to be greater than their impact on industry structure itself. To "the early Victorian economists, marveling over the mechanical efficiency of the monster textile mills," size came to be equated with efficiency. But they were also strong believers in competition, so the attribution of efficiency to size gave rise to a conceptual dilemma that moved even the most reserved of British economists to describe it as "vexatious" and as the "dilemma which has given rise to all this pother."

The virtues of competition, so obvious to the early British economists, were of course utterly lost upon Marx, who regarded competition as merely an evolutionary stage in the development of capitalism—a particularly exploitive stage at that. To one who had little use for competition, the greater efficiency of the larger plants posed no dilemma whatever: competition was in conflict with the requirements of technology and would therefore have to pass from the scene. "One capitalist lays a number of his fellow capitalists low." As a result, capital becomes "centralized" in the hands of fewer producers, and production becomes concentrated in ever larger industrial establishments. The

process will continue until the few monopolies that are left drop "like ripe plums" into the hands of the workers.

Although from the dawn of the Industrial Revolution through the first third of this century the general direction of change was toward a larger scale of operations, technology is always in motion; like a great river, its only constant is change. And, like a river, technology can completely reverse its course when an easier and simpler route presents itself. Up to the 1930s, observers of the industrial scene could be forgiven if they failed to foresee that what had been true of the past would not be true of the future. There was little warning that the new technologies just emerging would have an effect on size quite different from the effect of technologies of the past. By making possible economic production with a smaller capital outlay, these new technologies have lowered the barriers to entry, thus creating a potential stimulus to competition. By enabling small plants to match, or even exceed, the productive efficiency of large plants, they have brought about a radical geographic decentralization of production.

The early "capital-saving" or "decentralizing" technologies have occurred in much the same areas as did the improvements that underlay the Industrial Revolution—power, machines and transportation. Just as steam had replaced water wheels as the primary source of industrial power, so steam was replaced by electricity; as single-purpose, highly specialized machines operating in sequence had replaced skilled craftsmen, so they were replaced by newer, more flexible and adaptable multipurpose machines; and as railroads had replaced the canal, the wagon and the oxcart, so railroads have suffered from the inroads of truck and automobile.

Electrification has been the essential prerequisite to industrial decentralization. While steam drew industrial plants in around the source of power, electricity has diffused power to the plants, thereby making possible their location in terms of markets and other economic factors. In contrast to direct application of steam, the difference in cost according to the quantity of power used is negligible with electricity. And because electricity can be transmitted over great distances, its industrial use is feasible in areas that do not have access to adequate supplies of low-cost fuels.

Decentralizing technologies also began to appear in the areas of machinery and processes. The most important mechanical capital-saving technique is the independently operated, multipurpose machine. Powered by electricity and practically independent of its surroundings, the multipurpose machine can run intermittently and quickly change the nature of its product, thereby enabling the small plant to adapt its output to changes in demand.

The motor truck made it no longer necessary to channel raw materials over great distances from a relatively small number of rich sources into a few giant clusters of industrial facilities located along railroad routes. And no longer was the mass distribution of finished products limited only to those markets which could economically be served by the railroads. In essence, the truck tended to transform the inflow of materials and the outflow of finished products from a giant national pattern into smaller regional and local patterns. Within these smaller market areas, the decentralized plant, obtaining its materials and distributing

its finished products by truck, frequently gained important advantages over larger but distant plants, harnessed to the inflexible railroad lines. The truck-serviced, decentralized plants tapped nearby sources of low-cost raw materials that had never been exploited merely because they did not exist in sufficient quantities to justify the expense of a railroad line. But of even greater importance was the decentralized plant's ability to service nearby markets and to share in their growth and expansion.


Quite apart from the truck, the automobile had its own decentralizing effects. No longer did a plant need to be located within a large industrial center to be assured of an adequate supply of labor. The workers, using their automobiles, could commute over long distances. Indeed, because of the growing problem of traffic congestion, large plants have become a rarity within major cities.

Electricity, the multipurpose machine and the truck, introduced during the first third of this century, initially arrested and then reversed the trend toward a larger scale of operations. It is now evident that they were merely the precursors of a host of technologies whose effect on industry structures appears to be in the same direction. These new technologies are to be found principally in new forms of materials, new ways of creating power, and the new methods of employing electricity that go by the name of electronics. Some of these new technologies have already become familiar on the industrial scene, while others await only a critical technological breakthrough. But, whether they are a present reality or a potentiality for the future, these new technologies have a common characteristic that differentiates them from the older ways: they make possible economic production with smaller capital outlays, thereby reducing the barriers to entry, stimulating the entrance of newcomers, and lending a strong impetus to the restoration of competition.

Just as steel replaced lumber, so steel is now being replaced by newer materials which, unlike lumber, provide complete standardization for production but resemble the older material by permitting fabrication with simpler and less costly equipment in smaller establishments. Not only are these materials equal to steel in uniformity; they are superior in other important respects, such as strength and stiffness in relation to weight, resistance to corrosion, and insulation properties. All are essentially families of materials, to which new variants are continually being added. The most important of the ongoing developments in the field of materials are plastics, fiberglass-reinforced plastics, "high performance" composites and new forms of concrete such as prestressed concrete.

While their use dates back to the 19th century, it was not until the years following World War II that plastics became important in the American economy. The growth of plastic production since then has been little short of astonishing, output having doubled every five years. No other industry begins to compare with plastics in projected growth rates. One study, for example, has predicted a growth rate roughly *ten times* that of any other materials industry. The plastics industry's trade association has observed, "The statement that we are moving toward a 'plastic age' is not so far wrong. Students of the subject believe, in fact, that twenty years hence *more products will be made of plastics than of all other materials combined.*"

In appraising the effects of plastics on size of operations, it is necessary to distinguish between the production of plastic materials and the fabrication of finished and semi-finished products from such materials. For the most part the materials themselves are manufactured by a few large chemical and oil companies. The decentralizing effects come in the later stages of fabrication into semi-finished and finished products—a remarkably unconcentrated area. Since most of the fabricating industries that



are feeling the inroads of plastics are themselves concentrated, the process of substitution exerts a decentralizing influence on individual markets, as well as on the economy as a whole.

According to a study by Alan Greenspan, the average plastics fabrication establishment is "a very small operation" with average employment of little more than fifty workers per plant:

The major reason the industry is made up of relatively small plants is the absence of any substantial economies of size. A cursory glance shows that average profit as a per cent of sales or net worth does tend to increase as plant size gets larger. However, this is almost all accounted for by the large number of unsuccessful small companies whose losses obscure the profitability of the other small companies. When the analysis is limited to profit-generating plants, rate of return on sales or against net worth shows no evidence of being markedly higher with increasing plant size.

There is no doubt that ease of entry, low capital requirements and relatively small plant size have made both the plastics materials and the fabrication industries highly price competitive.

The unconcentrated structure of plastics fabrication derives from the simplicity and low cost of the machinery and equipment involved. According to Forbes Howard of Borg-Warner's Marbon Division, "a thermo-forming mold made of epoxy . . . costs approximately one to two per cent of an equivalent steel stamping die and we have yet to find out how many pieces can be run from such a mold before the mold needs replacement."

Like many plastics, fiberglass (plastic reinforced with glass fibers) was introduced during World War II, for such uses as radomes for aircraft, electronic components, body armor and protective clothing. Since the war its growth rate has roughly paralleled that of plastics generally, output doubling about every five years. This expansion, again like that of plastics, has been helped along by price reductions that have taken place in the face of rising prices for competitive materials.

As a general rule, the capital costs for plastics are about 1 to 2 per cent, and for fiberglass about 8 to 10 per cent, of the costs of fabrication from steel. Essentially, the higher capital costs for fiberglass arise from the fact that, being impervious to heat, it cannot be injected into a mold in liquid form.

The most exciting of the materials are the "high-performance" composites—filaments of extremely high stiffness and strength bonded together by a soft plastic matrix. The idea of achieving superior properties by combining different materials is not new; in the *Iliad* Homer describes shields made of wood, hide and bronze. In general, the most important structural properties of a material are stiffness and strength: stiffness governs the deformation or deflection of the structural member; strength governs the ultimate load that the member can carry. In these qualities the new composites are far superior to natural materials such as steel and aluminum. Carbon composites have strength-to-weight ratios ranging up to four times those of steel and aluminum. In terms of stiffness, both the upper and lower limits are well in excess of those of both steel and aluminum, the advantage ranging from two to five times over the traditional materials. To put it another way,

carbon composites can provide the same strength as steel with as little as one-fourth the weight, the same stiffness with as little as one-fifth the weight.

An example is the Ford GT-40 racing car, which won the 1968 Le Mans twenty-four-hour road race: "The weight of the Ford body, made in England by Glass Fiber Engineering Ltd., was reduced from 140 pounds for the glass-fiber-cloth-reinforced polyester to 70-80 pounds. The same body in steel weighs about 500 pounds."

The new composite that appears to hold the greatest promise is carbon fiber, and the country in which most of the progress has been made is Great Britain. Described as threads of "pure carbon having enormous strength and looking like fine strands of shiny dark grey hair," it is regarded by *The Economist* as "a material that could form the basis for a whole new engineering industry and where Britain has, for once, a head-and-shoulders lead over the rest of the field." At the moment, the material is plagued by the familiar vicious circle whereby high price restricts consumption, which in turn limits output and produces a high price. But in this case, because of the capital-saving nature of the new technology, only a relatively small volume of output would be needed to recapture the capital costs required to build a continuous carbon-fiber production plant. Once the costs of producing the fibers are brought down to commercially feasible levels, the presses, dies and other equipment that have already been developed by fiberglass fabricators can be used for plastics reinforced with the high-performance composites.

Increasingly, the problem will be to select from a wide array of materials and their combinations the particular one best suited for a given use. For each of the materials, he must possess or have access to expert knowledge on costs, methods of fabrication, properties, applications, characteristics, strengths, weaknesses and so on. And, in contrast to what is needed for natural materials, whose properties are more or less fixed, this knowledge must include an awareness of how the properties of synthetic materials can be altered by changing their chemical composition. It is partly because of this premium on specialized knowledge that most of the fabrication of plastics products is done by custom molders who are experts in that one particular field; for the same reason, the large conglomerate corporations have done quite poorly in fiberglass. As Dr. Stephen Tsai put it:

Composite materials are highly sophisticated materials and require sophisticated understanding for their proper design and utilization. The traditional method for materials selection of ordinary metals is no longer adequate. Substitution of aluminum for steel or titanium for aluminum no longer applies in the case of composite materials. A given composite system, e.g., boron-plastic composites, covers a range of properties depending on the particular design of fiber orientation, fiber volume fractions, methods of laminations, and processing. Thus, the utilization of a composite material requires a higher level of technology than that of ordinary materials.

But given the materials and the knowledge of how to use them, relatively little is required in the way of labor or capital. These new materials are neither labor intensive nor capital intensive; they are knowledge intensive.

For centuries the production process has been powered by fossil fuels—repositories of the energy of the sun.

Originally employed to yield light and heat, coal and oil became sources of power through a long history of mechanical inventions beginning in the early days of the Industrial Revolution. These inventions were founded on the principle of the "Carnot," or heat cycle, in which chemical energy locked in the fossil fuels is converted into heat, which is then converted into mechanical energy by engines and motors.

Because it offers improved efficiency, less waste and less maintenance and repair, greater simplicity is an inherent objective of scientific and engineering progress. Just as the essential character of the new materials is simplicity in use, so also is simplicity the common characteristic of new power-creating technologies. In the case of some of the new sources, such as batteries and fuel cells, simplicity is achieved by converting chemical energy directly into electrical energy, bypassing the heat stage. In others, principally those suitable for electric power plants, the goal is to eliminate the mechanical stage. In still others, notably gas turbines and rotary-piston engines, greater simplicity is achieved by substituting continuous rotary motion for reciprocating action. From the point of view of industrial structure, the significance of the new technologies lies in the fact that their greater simplicity means savings in capital costs and thus a greater potential for decentralization of output.

Today, the electric vehicle has again become a subject of interest for both economic and ecological reasons. The economic argument is based on the vehicle's impressive efficiency for short trips, which in the aggregate make up a large proportion of the total miles traveled. Electric cars with a range of 40 miles, which could make four trips a day of fewer than 10 miles or two trips of fewer than 20 miles, could take over about half the total passenger car usage. The most immediate way of making an electric car once again a commercial reality is by use of batteries. The oldest form of storage battery is the lead-acid battery: "It works well, it is durable and it is cheap." Inasmuch as cars powered by this battery had a range of 20 miles forty years ago, it should not be surprising that today ranges beyond 60 miles have been reported.

But why should anyone who is free to choose between the gasoline-powered car and a battery-powered car willingly choose the latter, since he would be selecting a car suitable only for short trips in preference to one that can be used for both short and long trips? One reason is economy; operating costs of 1¢ or less a mile are claimed for the electric car as compared to 3 to 4¢ for the gasoline-powered automobile. Other selling points are simplicity of operation and an absence of maintenance problems, which are particularly important where the principal use would be as a second car for neighborhood errands.

However, the most compelling reason may well turn out to be a compulsory government requirement necessitated by the growing menace of air pollution, more than half of which stems directly from the fumes emitted by the gasoline-powered reciprocating engine. If it proves impossible to bring the emissions of the reciprocating engine down to acceptable levels—and that is not at all unlikely—action will have to be taken to force the use of alternatives.

Like the battery, the fuel cell converts chemical energy

directly into electrical energy, but it does so without the need for recharging. It operates on a fuel which, like gasoline, can be externally stored and replenished. The fuel cell, whose efficiency far surpasses that of any other energy-producing device, has been developed well beyond the theoretical stage. In 1959 an Allis-Chalmers farm tractor was powered successfully by a fuel cell. In 1965 power was furnished for the Gemini V space capsule by a hydrogen-oxygen fuel cell. A year later the army successfully powered an M-37 truck with a hydrazine fuel cell.

When, as, and if the electric car becomes widely used, the effects on the highly concentrated structure of the automobile industry should be far-reaching. Whether powered by batteries or fuel cells, the electric car is such a simple mechanism that not only medium-size but small manufacturers should be able to enter the ranks of automobile producers. Neither the battery nor the fuel cell is subject to scaling limitations: their efficiency is virtually independent of size. Moreover, the close tolerances required of a piston engine are not necessary for an electric unit, and that saves both capital and labor costs.

Simplicity can be achieved, even in a heat engine, by substituting rotary motion for up-and-down action. Two types of engine embodying the rotary principle have been developed for vehicular use—the turbine engine and the rotary-piston (Wankel) engine. Reflecting their greater simplicity, both can be produced economically with a substantially smaller capital outlay than is required for the piston engine. Moreover, air pollution would be reduced very definitely by the turbine and possibly by the rotary-piston engine.

According to Chrysler's George J. Huebner, Jr., the major technical problems of the turbine engines have been overcome. How is it, then, that the car is still not on the market? Huebner's response was, "Low-speed fuel consumption was not *quite* good enough; noise, while *acceptable* to most of the drivers, needed further reduction; greater engine braking was desirable; and a *slight* lag in acceleration from a standing start had to be eliminated." Such a reply raises more questions than it answers. Obviously, by their very nature as well as by the way in which they are described, these problems are marginal. And it is certainly not clear by whose standards fuel consumption is not "quite" good enough, or noise still excessive (though not to "most" drivers), or the "slight" lag in acceleration not acceptable. In view of its enthusiastic reception by 203 test drivers, it is hard to understand why Chrysler has not given the market an opportunity to judge. Perhaps if given the chance, a substantial number of buyers would decide that the shortcomings were more than offset by the car's remarkable attributes, including savings of nearly 50 per cent on fuel costs. And from the point of view of public interest, the shortcomings would seem a small price to pay for an engine that can approach the piston engine in performance but at the same time reduce drastically the emission of pollutants.

The rotary-piston engine is now a commercial reality, owing to the pioneering efforts of NSU, a small German automobile manufacturer, and more recently by Toyo Nogyo, the third largest Japanese automobile producer. It is the product of research and development work going back to 1926, when the German engineer Felix Wankel became

interested in rotating engines and established an institute for their study because he "considered the shaking and pounding of the reciprocating piston engine unesthetic as compared with the running of a turbine or electric motor."

Eliminated are valves and valve mechanisms, connecting rods, unbalanced inertial forces, various orders of vibration, limitation on rpm's, problems of hot exhaust valves and a resulting limitation on compression ratio. Other advantages are the use of less expensive, low-octane gasoline; less vibration, and fewer parts and components requiring lubrication, care and maintenance. The saving of about one-third in the weight of the engine makes possible reductions in the size of the car, suspension, brakes and tires. And, what is of principal interest here, the fundamental simplicity of the mechanism would also permit economical production in smaller plants.

Since World War II, enormous advances have taken place in the development of a wide range of commercial devices which utilize the flow of electrons in a vacuum, in gaseous media, or in semi-conductors. As a general principle the improvement in speed, range and flexibility of operations made possible by these devices has far outweighed their cost. For some uses—e.g., miniaturization—they have improved performance while at the same time dramatically reducing the size and cost of capital equipment. In other applications—e.g., computers—the increase in capital costs has been far less than the utilities yielded.

Since their introduction in the early 1950s, computers have been widely regarded as constituting a powerful force toward a further concentration of industry. This impression has been based partly on cost; only the largest firms, it was thought, could afford them. And partly it has been based on the assumption that their principal use would be within not the office but the *plant*; the larger the plant and the more functions it performs, the greater the opportunities for cost savings through computers. The image of the computer-controlled, unstaffed, fully automated plant has bemused businessmen and intellectual apostles of cybernetics alike. That it has not come to pass, except in special circumstances, has certainly not been for want of effort. Im-

measurable amounts of energy, time, brainpower and money have gone down the drain in trying to "computerize" productive operations. But even before the computer made its appearance, routine functions within the plant had already been automated with simpler and less costly devices—the electrical and electronic devices that indicate, measure, record and control. Contrary to what is generally believed, these devices are applicable to plants of all sizes.

Computers have been brought within the reach of smaller firms by the introduction of "desk-size" models, which can be purchased for a few thousand dollars and will perform thousands of calculations per second. But the development that has made the computer economical for even the smallest concerns is the data-processing center—an organization which provides processing services for a fee. There are now thousands of such centers in the United States, with hundreds in every major city.

The computer enables the smaller firms to perform functions whose costs under previous methods of data processing—hand tabulation, punch-card systems, and so on—were prohibitive to all but the largest firms. In other words, the smaller firm was in the past barred by its lack of resources from securing types of information that could be obtained by the larger company.

With plastics, fiberglass and high-performance composites providing high-strength and easily processed materials suitable for an infinite variety of applications; with energy provided by such simple and efficient devices as high-energy batteries, fuel cells, turbine engines and rotary piston engines; with computers providing a means of instantaneously retrieving, sorting, and aggregating vast bodies of information; and with other new electronic devices harnessing the flow of electrons for other uses, there appears to be aborning a second industrial revolution, which, among its other features, can reverse the centripetal pull of industrial development that has troubled social critics almost since the birth of the first Industrial Revolution. Whether or not that liberating tendency does make itself felt depends less on the technologies themselves than on the social environments in which they are emerging. □

TRUTH IN LABELING

HOW GOOD IS DELICIOUS?

JENNIFER CROSS

Mrs. Cross is a British free-lance journalist, now living in Santa Rosa, Calif. She is the author of The Supermarket Trap (Indiana University Press).

Do consumers have the right to know *exactly* what they are eating, particularly the nutritional value of the thousands of processed foods in today's supermarkets? Controversy over this argument is rapidly building up into a fairly hot election year issue: it will erupt this summer when a number of Truth in Labeling bills are aired in Congress.

Already food labeling reform is the subject of bitter undercover wrangling among consumer organizations, the food industry and the Food & Drug Administration. People familiar with the Truth in Packaging hearings (1961-66) are already beginning to feel that they have been there before. This time, though, the game is being played at a higher level of finesse, and (mercifully) with a greater sense of urgency.

The opening move came at the end of March, when the Food & Drug Administration announced preliminary guidelines for the nutritional labeling of packaged foods under its jurisdiction. Manufacturers wishing to make

nutritional claims for their products (they would not be obliged to do so) would have to use a uniform format. It would list the number of calories in a 1 cup (8 oz.) or other reasonably sized serving, and the amount of protein, fat and carbohydrates in grams. It would also state the amount of protein, vitamin A, thiamin, riboflavin, niacin, vitamin C, calcium and iron as a percentage of the Recommended Daily Allowance (RDA), i.e., the daily nutrients required to keep the average person healthy.

The guidelines were FDA's response to the growing concern of nutritionists and consumer groups about the declining state of the nation's diet, and the fact that, as Dr. Jean Mayer put it, we are becoming "a nation of nutritional illiterates." During the latter part of 1971 and early 1972, five food chains—Giant Food, Kroger, Jewel, First National and the Berkeley Consumers Co-op—worked with the FDA to test different ways that nutritional information might be presented to the public.

The resulting guidelines were released with the usual spicing of pious self-congratulation. FDA Commissioner Charles C. Edwards commented that "they could provide one of the most fundamental changes in the history of food labeling in this country." Out in Berkeley, Don Rothenberg, education director of the Co-op, was less polite. He called the whole program a soft-shoe shuffle, designed to "pacify the consumer instead of doing something meaningful about truth in labeling."

A close look at the FDA's proposals shows them to be full of holes. For a start, they are voluntary, forcing no shy manufacturer into compliance. They would not cover meat products, these being the province of the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Even if carried out, they would confuse some people who can't relate grams to ordinary household measurements, or who are more used to seeing nutritional information as a percentage of the minimum daily requirements instead of the RDAs. More important are the omissions—the percentage of ingredients, the net drained weight, the type of fat and the flavorings and additives used. Lack of a standard serving may also pose a problem. Different manufacturers could choose different sized servings for the same products: some products, like soup, come in different forms; also the industry practice of packaging to price (reducing the net contents) could play havoc even with reasonable serving sizes.

What really got under the Co-op's skin, however, was the way in which the FDA rushed its proposals through—one month before the Co-op's twelve-week labeling program had even started. Adding insult to injury, the FDA will not extend its usual ninety-day comment period for just one month to allow the Co-op to complete and evaluate its program. Mary Ruth Nelson, the Co-op home economist in charge, even went to Washington to beg Commissioner James Grant for extra time. She was refused.

The Co-op was not the only consumer group caught on the hop. Last December, a conference of consumer activists was called at Milwaukee by Helen Nelson, a veteran fighter for Truth in Packaging (now director of the University of Wisconsin's Center for Consumer Affairs) and Rodney Leonard, head of the Community Nutrition Insti-

tute. Its purpose was to formulate a consumer strategy for labeling reform before the food industry got the attention of the politicians. It came up with a tough set of demands: percentage ingredient labeling, a clearer system of food grading, open dating and unit pricing. The conference also appointed a special committee to thresh out some of the technical problems involved and decide exactly how these recommendations for labeling reform should be implemented. This did not start meeting until early this year, leaving it precious little time to present its evidence before the end of June deadline.

The Co-op people feel they are being given the brush-off, which is all the more inexcusable because their program is quite the most interesting of the five food-chain experiments. Their labels, due to appear April 24 on eleven house brands, go much further than do others (or the FDA) in telling consumers what they want to know. In addition to nutritional breakdown, they include a full list of ingredients by percentages.

The new Co-op labels are an eye-opener, a foretaste of the revelations we can expect if we *really* want to know what's in our food. For example, they show an all-meat frankfurter, without preservatives, but with 26 per cent nonmeat ingredients, mostly added water. They show the high ratio of water in two condensed soups (62 and 82 per cent) and in a juice drink (84 per cent). They show corned beef that is 42 per cent beef, and a coffee creamer with 34 per cent coconut oil, three times higher in calories than evaporated milk.

The Berkeley experiment is unique in other ways, too. The Co-op's well-educated, prosperous clientele is the cream of the nation's shoppers. Its reactions to the program are being monitored by Prof. Rosemarie Ostwald, from the Nutrition Department of the University of California, Berkeley. She hopes to discover whether people's understanding of nutrition improves, or their purchasing habits change, during the test period. If labeling reform doesn't catch on in Berkeley, it is unlikely to catch on anywhere, and shoppers will need help from other sources, e.g. advertising, if they are to become better educated and better fed.

The Co-op's program might also dispose of an argument that food manufacturers, echoed by the FDA, fall back on to avoid the issue of full disclosure. Some claim they cannot list percentages because they don't know exactly what goes into their product, at least from batch to batch. They would have to jack up their quality control to insure that claims made on the label were accurate; that would be expensive and result in higher prices. They also claim, with more justification, that it is technically difficult or impossible to monitor certain foods like canned products and frozen food mixtures to insure a correct analysis.

So far the Co-op's experience suggests that many of these fears are red herrings. Analysis of the test items, done at the USDA's Western Regional Research Laboratories, has been relatively simple, largely thanks to the FDA's generous tolerance for errors. The samples examined varied by only 1 per cent from their claimed nutritional contents.

Despite its potential importance, the Co-op's program brought nothing but trouble for all concerned, and steadily


deteriorating relations with the FDA. The Co-op, a late-comer to the labeling experiment, was included only because the Consumer Federation of America complained that no consumer organization was being represented. When the Co-op began to encounter supplier resistance to percentage ingredient labeling, the FDA refused to help. Indeed, Dr. Virgil Wodicka, director of the FDA's Bureau of Foods, laughed at the idea of persuading the food companies to go along, and suggested the Co-op drop its attempt to get full disclosure. He also vetoed their request for financial help for the survey work, or the use of FDA laboratory facilities to do the product analysis.

Why is the FDA in such a rush to put its labeling proposals into effect? Why could it allow peanut butter manufacturers to bicker for eleven years over a miserable 3 per cent of extra peanuts, yet refuse to help the Co-op, or allow them even a single additional month to provide crucial information about something as important as nutritional labeling? And why is the FDA missing out on the full disclosure that consumer groups say they want?

Ironically, one reason is the buildup of consumer pressure for labeling reform, which has already been felt in Congress, and, porpoise-like, is treading on the FDA's tail. Demands for changes in the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act and the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act to allow nutritional labeling with a full disclosure of ingredients have been coming in from all sides—from the White House Conference on Food, Nutrition & Health (December 1969), on Aging (December 1971), from the Consumer Federation of America (January 1972), and consumer groups across the country.

As a result, labeling reform bills have been arriving thick and fast on Capitol Hill, including S. 2734 (introduced by Sen. Richard S. Schweiker) and HR 8670 and 9618 (introduced by Rep. Benjamin S. Rosenthal). This June, hearings will start in the Senate Consumer Subcommittee on the most important bill of all—the Truth in Labeling Act, S. 3083, introduced by Sens. Frank Moss and Vance Hartke. It would *require* some form of nutritional labeling, the listing of all ingredients (but not necessarily the percentages), the inclusion of the manufacturer's name and address (so that people may know who is behind the private labels), plus open dating of perishables, and a clear system of quality grading. The nutritional labeling provisions hinge on the FDA guidelines. The agency cannot afford to proceed at its usual snail's pace, particularly since the cyclamate and Bon Vivant affairs have tarnished its image.

There is another, more subtle, reason for the FDA's rushed guidelines. The agency is responding to industry's desire to head off legislation which might force it into compliance. The jolly green giants would love to be able to say—as they did with open dating and unit pricing—“We don't need legislation, we are complying voluntarily.” Last December, the trade journal *Supermarketing* outlined the prevailing strategy: aim for voluntary adoption before being forced into a legal straitjacket. If all else fails, aim for compromise legislation. “It may be,” said *Supermarketing*, “that these changes are coming, that they are demanded, and that it is our job to implement them. To



resist these changes is foolhardy. To direct them—genius.”

Publicly, the industry supports nutritional labeling as a “motherhood” issue. The giants are well aware of USDA surveys showing that the country is less well nourished today than it was ten to fifteen years ago. They know that millions of Americans are overweight, suffer from heart trouble or food allergies, and ought to be watching their diets. The industry's sales records show the trend toward overconsumption of overprocessed foods. The manufacturers also know that the public is exposed to conflicting health claims, and lacks the information it needs to shop sensibly.

The nutritional knowledge gap was amusingly brought home at a San Francisco meeting of top food industry and FDA brass arranged by the American Management Association in April. Sixty-one people, mostly food manufacturers, plus Drs. Wodicka and Johnson from the FDA, filled in a short questionnaire drawn up by the Berkeley Co-op called “Guess What's in the Food You Eat.” Only one person (probably Dr. Johnson) got all the answers right! Interestingly, the majority said that they had received no nutritional education at school, and got none by watching TV commercials.

However, aside from the dairymen, the prune growers and the orange-juice squeezers, who are doubtless gleefully snapping at the chance to get their nutritional message across, the majority of food processors regard full Truth in Labeling as indecent exposure, to be avoided at all costs. Looking at the highly processed junk cramming

today's supermarkets, one can see why. Huge amounts of space accrue to skimpy TV dinners, meat products extended with soy protein and fat, high-calorie snacks, plastic-like puddings, toppings, nonnutritious beverages and unenriched baked goods. The best that even Madison Avenue ingenuity can say about them is "Mm! Mm! Good!" Unfortunately, many of them are exceedingly profitable, both for the manufacturers and the stores. If people *really* got nutrition-conscious and began to avoid them, the wailing would be heard all the way from Wall Street to Congress.

Percentage ingredient listing has always been vetoed on the grounds that it would give away secrets and permit the country to be flooded by (among other things) cheap Japanese copies of Campbell's soup. Most manufacturers, of course, know pretty well what goes into the other fellow's can. Most secrets lie in the spicing and blending, knowledge which consumers would cheerfully forgo if they could be sure of how much meat and other principal ingredients they were getting.

A more telling reason for the food manufacturers' attitude is that they don't want FDA inspectors on their backs, poking, prying, examining plant records, and making their own tests to see whether the claims on the label are true. Any mandatory form of percentage ingredient listing would require a huge increase in the FDA's budget and inspection staff, the last thing industry would like.

Percentage ingredient listing might reduce manufacturers' traditional ability to juggle with their products when the cost of the ingredients rises, or for other competitive reasons. Anyone who has ever examined the FDA's records of seizures for what is politely called "misbranding" knows that a common trick is to scrimp on the good ingredients and replace them with cheap fillers. Labeling reform would increase the giants' chances of getting caught out, whether by the FDA or by the shopper.

Faced with actual invitations to participate in percentage ingredient labeling experiments, individual food manufacturers not surprisingly balked. The Berkeley Co-op had utmost difficulty in persuading its suppliers to go along, and was refused point-blank by three of them (Foell, a Chicago meatpacker, Boston Bonnie and Ralston Purina).

Esther Peterson, formerly President Johnson's special assistant for consumer affairs, now with Giant Food, ran into a similar situation. Her first try at full disclosure drew a blank. Only after months of bargaining, when her status at Giant was sufficiently established, could she persuade the company to lean on some of its suppliers to get even a modest amount of information. Giant's new program, which will tell people the amount of the main ingredient they're getting (e.g., how much chicken in chicken soup), starts the same time as the Co-op's; it also may be finished too late for inclusion in the period the FDA assigns for comment.

Given the selfish facts of food industry marketing, it is not surprising that the FDA is too timid to push the giants further and faster than they want to go. In recent months the agency has issued watered-down regulations for orange-juice drink labeling, and mediocre nutritional standards for TV dinners. It turned down a petition by LABEL, Inc., a group of George Washington University

law students, requesting the listing of all ingredients on the food package. Finally, it is now mulling an excellent chance to do something serious about labeling reform.

Left to themselves, many food giants may well adopt the FDA's nutritional labeling guidelines. The larger companies already have the information on file; they are bracing themselves to use it in the hope of satisfying consumers' growing demand for information. With all due respect to these companies, voluntary compliance has distinct limitations. Labeling reform is in danger of being used as a promotional gimmick, which could run its course much like trading stamps and bonus bingo. It could also lead to a rash of dubious advertising claims, or to shotgun food enrichment to jack up nutritional quality.

In the long run, nutritional information will be useful only if every manufacturer offers it. How many people would buy the Co-op corned beef hash simply because they knew what was in it? Would they applaud the Co-op for its honesty, or buy another brand in the hope of getting more than 42 per cent meat? Should they decide instead that it's a poor buy and take potluck with a can of stew or a TV dinner? Unless each product carries a product statement, how can shoppers decide?

What, then, are consumers' chances for getting legislation which would make such labeling mandatory? The most that can be hoped for this session is that the issue will get an airing. Soon after the hearings start, the members of the Senate Consumer Subcommittee who are up for re-election will melt away to attend to their campaigns. After November, Senator Moss is optimistic. "The provisions are very reasonable. Apart from the difficulties of getting all the ingredients on the label, I can't see what food manufacturers could object to." Doubtless the Senator knows from past experience that the giants probably *won't* object. They will say, proudly, that they are doing it already.

Disappointing as the FDA's guidelines are, they have at least proved one thing: the majority of shoppers who have taken part in the experiments have used and appreciated nutritional labeling. At Giant Food, for example, the first test was so successful that the company plans to relabel all its house brands with the information people want. Obviously, labeling reform has its limits as an educational tool. It would not be as useful as serious attempts by food advertisers to inform the public, and stricter standards for how they should do it (problems, incidentally, on which the Federal Trade Commission is currently working). But truthful labels would help. If people *really* want this change, they will have to push for it hard, and soon. Otherwise Truth in Labeling will turn out to be just as much of a dud as Truth in Packaging. □

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BOOKS & THE ARTS

Mishima's Testimony, Wanton and Reverent

BARBARA WOLF

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A year has passed since Yukio Mishima's spectacular suicide, and the events of that year help to make sense out of what seemed at the time a particularly senseless occasion. Abroad, the bloody rite of *seppuku* was received as an incomprehensible barbarism. In Japan, it aroused powerful but conflicting emotions that seem to have canceled one another out. Like an inscrutable Zen master, Mishima performed an outrageous act meant to awaken his people, and confounded them instead. Much of his career had been baffling and wasteful, and he was surely trying to achieve with his death the purpose that had obsessed him always.

From the time his books first began to appear, Mishima was likened to such figures as Gide, Genet, Sade and Beckett. These comparisons raise expectations that the works do not entirely satisfy. Certainly his novels and plays are rich enough in sadists, nihilists, compulsives and homosexuals, in melancholy obsessions and bizarre events—the whole sad mess somehow evoking a troubled, elusive vision of the modern world. Some of his novels are in the first person, narrated by one of his alienated anti-heroes. These fictions are often assumed to be autobiographical, despite Mishima's emphatic denials. The author himself has been characterized as an apologist for fascism or nihilism or homosexuality, again over his protest. Nevertheless, Mishima was a flamboyant public figure, who seemed to invite controversy for publicity's sake. And the development of his anti-heroes is sometimes so convincing, his exploration of their inner lives so vivid, that their words have the authenticity of personal confession. Many of these characters certainly do resemble those of Genet or Sade, and yet Mishima's attitude toward them is very different. If a part of the author went into their creation, it was a part which he feared and repudiated, just as Dostoevski feared and repudiated that part of him which went into the Underground Man.

If Mishima can be properly likened to any foreign writer, it must

be Dostoevski, although Mishima is much the inferior artist. Both men were fascinated by certain currents in modern thought—materialism, egalitarianism, atheism, individualism—fascinated and appalled. Both believed that such doctrines destroy the social and spiritual bonds that define the individual's place in the universe and keep his will under control. Both looked backward to a Utopia: in Dostoevski's case, to Russian Orthodoxy and Pan-Slavism; in Mishima's, to a private vision of the Japanese past. Each created thoroughly imagined portraits of characters who had succumbed to the contagion of modern ideas, for both men were themselves endangered, tempted by those hated ideas, as if by a wicked but irresistible seductress. And because they felt that attraction, their works were subtly tainted and ambiguous. The reader who takes Ivan Karamazov or the Underground Man to be Dostoevski's spokesman is mistaken but not perverse.

The novel which first brought Mishima to international attention was *The Temple of the Golden Pavilion*, written in 1951, when the author was 26 years old and already one of Japan's literary celebrities. *The Golden Pavilion* is one of his best novels and in many ways his most characteristic. The story is based on actual events and explores the motives of the young Zen monk who, in 1950, burned the 14th-century Kinkakuji, the most celebrated work of Buddhist architecture in Japan. At his trial, the arsonist, a puny young man with a stammer, declared that he had burnt it because it was so beautiful and ancient, whereas he was mortal and ugly. The book, then, is a study of a person incapable of transcendence, one who cannot love but must envy what he admires. No one familiar with Mishima's life can believe that he identified himself with this character in the usual sense. Mishima revered beauty, much in the way of the Platonists and the English Romantics, as the manifestation of the sublime. To such a man, the deliberate destruction of a masterpiece represents an act so outrageous that it cries out to be explained. Mishima gives a seemingly compassionate portrayal of the arsonist. To be more exact, he makes him pitiable. The youth's self-loathing, his imprisonment within himself, reinforced by his stammer, his obsession and despair, his lack of what Richard Hughes calls a "foothold in the universe"—all

these are beautifully observed. He is a sufferer in the most extreme degree, and if Genet is right in saying that deliberate suffering is the primary qualification for sainthood, then he is a saint. But Mishima is not Genet, and he makes it clear that his anti-hero willfully chooses suffering to justify the exercise of his nihilistic will. Destroying the pavilion establishes his right to rule as absolute master over nothingness.

Yet envious and destructive as he is, the young arsonist is no worse than the world around him, and perhaps better. The burning of the temple is almost as much an act of reverence as of envy, for the world is unfit to contain so transcendent an object. The head priest is a fraud. The other acolytes are spiritually empty, products of the moral bankruptcy and aimlessness that characterized the nation as a whole in the first years after the defeat. The foreign world, represented by air raids during the war and drunken GI tourists afterward, has nothing to offer to fill the spiritual void. The temple is the symbol of a greatness which has passed. It is a holy thing, contaminated and desecrated by contact with the new age. Only the young anti-hero is sensitive to the beauty the pavilion embodies and to the meaning it has lost. Almost as surely as he destroys the temple because he hates and envies it, he destroys it to redeem it.

The 13-year-old boy who kills his mother's lover in *The Sailor Who Fell from Grace with the Sea* is a less complex character but one of the same kind. Mishima deliberately deprives him of a "psychological" motive. The boy does not resent the sailor for replacing his dead father; he had never loved his father. He is not jealous of his mother's feeling for the sailor; he does not love his mother either. The boy is in no way maladjusted or neurotic. He is simply a precocious intellectual totally committed to nihilism, and he kills to prove his superiority to morality and sentiment. His act is the logical consequence of his ideas.

The boy sees the sailor for the first time through a peephole, as he strips to make love to the mother. The sailor's body is virile and strong, his face hard and sunburnt, his manner direct and confident. The boy imagines that such a man will coldly use and discard the woman, and he is thrilled with admiration. When he discovers that in fact

the sailor plans to marry the mother, to work in her business, to become a loving stepfather, his admiration turns to contempt. Now, if this were all, such a reaction would amount to little more than an exaggeration of the male adolescent's aversion to seeing a free man tamed. But this particular boy is no Huckleberry Finn. He has already tortured and killed a cat to liberate himself from "sentimentality." Now he decides to kill the man who represents the surrender to feeling and responsibility.

One of the most memorable aspects of the novel is the sensitive handling of the affair between the sailor and the widow. *The Sailor Who Fell from Grace with the Sea* is not a first-person narrative. Instead, it employs the technique of multilateral subjectivity, a tradition in Japanese fiction since the 11th-century *Tale of Genji*, the same technique that so startled Western audiences in Kurosawa's motion picture classic, *Rashomon*. For the most part, the omniscient author keeps his opinions to himself and presents in the third person the subjective impressions and observations of his characters, retelling important scenes several times over, from the point of view of each of those involved. This technique creates a kind of objectivity that is nevertheless capable of effects of great intimacy. The reader first sees the lovers through the eyes of the fascinated child, as they come into the bedroom and undress without a word. Their behavior is conveyed to the reader as the expression of a merely impersonal lust. Only later, as the scene is told in flashback from the points of view of two lovers, does the reader come to understand it as they do, as a kind of miracle, too awesome to talk about. The widow, five years alone, is a pretty business executive, preoccupied and irritable, living from day to day more out of habit than purpose. The sailor is a disappointed romantic, uncommunicative and dreamy, who had sought in his life at sea an absolute that always eluded him. The sudden attraction which brings them together causes each to make a break in his life and habits. The woman, without premeditation, almost without thought or will, leads the man to her bed. The man, who has always deliberately avoided respectable women, accepts her invitation. Neither speaks a word about what this break means to him, and in fact, throughout the first phase of the affair, both are shy of expressing their thoughts or feelings at all. Yet each hopes that he is understood, and during the sailor's next voyage, they cautiously begin to reveal themselves in letters. When they meet again, they discover there are no barriers left between them and they decide to marry. The next phase in their growing intimacy—their dazed joy, their touching rejuvenation, the

sailor's eager domestication, the scene when they rush out into the freezing night to wait for the first sunrise of the year—all these are evoked with wonderful conviction. Previously aloof and reticent persons, the lovers open themselves to the world. They include their friends and acquaintances in their happiness, but the boy refuses to be included. The more love they give, the more bitterly he hates them, for they stand as a living contradiction to his convictions and aspirations. Mishima seemed to be saying that although the capacity to love, to transcend self and merge with another, still persists in the world, it cannot survive the enmity of those who deny it.

Readers tend to find *The Sailor* a sick and sickening book. In this case there is no question of identifying the author with his villain. He obviously detests the boy and sympathizes with the lovers. What seems mad is Mishima's having created so grotesque a situation and concluded it on a note of such deterministic horror. The boy is not alone in his viciousness. All his friends are the same, and together they stand for the future of society. Mishima employs symbols too sweeping and absolute to convince anyone not already convinced, and yet projected with such power that the reader

cannot help but feel and fear. Although the sophistication of the boy's nihilism seems arbitrary he cannot be dismissed. There are such types as that boy, and the history of the 20th century is full of their deeds. Mishima insists that persons like the boy not only exist but are directly the product of modern ideas and also the sure inheritors of the world.

The young monk in *The Golden Pavilion* makes an idol of his ugliness. The boy in *The Sailor* makes an idol of his ideas. In other works, Mishima offers studies of a more conventional kind of narcissism, portraying characters who make idols of their beauty. Mishima himself sometimes betrayed that kind of narcissism. Only a few weeks before his death, he sponsored an exhibit of photographs of himself in the nude, in a Tokyo department store. But Mishima's pride in his body was of a very particular kind. He had been a frail and sickly youth, too delicate to be accepted for military service even in the last desperate months of the war. Humiliated by this rejection, he devoted many years of effort into building for himself a body of extraordinary vigor and grace. "God made the world, but the Dutch made Holland," Dutchmen say, and no one accuses them

CLONING: FIRST PERSON FOR ANYONE

*I am a man who is myself
original in devotion to lips of snow
to magniloquent hazard and the iron
in my hand This icy statue this mirror
of my face that was raised in my garden
harrows my space Now that I write
the day is a shield a fiery globe
I carry into melting*

*No other than myself
has earned this place on the cot
this blanket / yellow orange & black
nor so precarious a comment
on the Earth's fields and waters
Charred and glowing place, I can say:
here the brutish legends of my body
rest*

*There can be no Galileo
of my taste of snow on a day
when there is no snow If I violate winter
it is by design, baked into my eyes
yellow orange & black*

*Out of chaos and license
I am delivered and return
as a region where a special mountain
was briefly heard I am a man
who is myself No one resembles
what has already happened*

*The statue
commemorates nothing but a twinge of light
Gene Frumkin*

of unseemly levity. Jean Nidetch, the founder of Weight Watchers, displays herself in public places and in photographs, but no one thinks her vain. Mrs. Nidetch and the Dutch display their creations as an artist displays a work he takes pride in. What they display represents a triumph of spirit and discipline and is meant to serve as inspiration to others. While Mishima's sickly anti-hero devotes much time and effort to destroying the beauty of the Golden Pavilion, his author, in his personal exhibitionism, seems to imply that such a man might better have devoted his efforts to making himself beautiful instead. His own hard-won perfection, like that of Mrs. Nidetch, was displayed to show the world that discipline and will are capable of transforming sickness into health and ugliness into beauty.

In contrast, the cruel beauties whom Mishima studies in his novels were born that way, and their sense of special election, the power they have over others, produces in them a self-love that is absolutely exclusive. Like Snow White's wicked stepmother, each spends his life asking the mirror for assurance that he is still "the fairest of them all." Etsuko, the heroine of *Thirst for Love*, lords it over a complex household of in-laws like a petty Cleopatra. The men are all dying of love for her, the women all dying of envy. She takes their subservience for granted and torments and despises them all. The only member of the household who is not in awe of her is the family's adolescent gardener. Piqued by his indifference, she falls in love with him. But having seduced him, she is appalled to find him unchanged. Instead of adoring her as a goddess bestowing favors, he treats her simply as an older woman who has thrown herself at him. Outraged, she kills him, and then inveigles her infatuated father-in-law into covering the evidence of her crime. For all her beauty and will, Etsuko would exercise no such dominion were not the others, in their feebler ways, as faulty as she. If the men did not plot to have her, if the women did not all hate her, she would be powerless.

Yuichi, the homosexual Adonis of *Forbidden Colors*, also demands human sacrifice to the idol of himself. He becomes the paid instrument of an elderly novelist who wants revenge on women who have rejected him. The novelist supplies Yuichi with enough pseudo-Nietzschean jargon to justify a global catastrophe, but in fact Yuichi needs no justification for the cruel games he is paid to play. Unlike Dorian Gray, who likes to rationalize, Yuichi innocently assumes that his great beauty gives him the right to dispose of others as he pleases. Bribe by the novelist, Yuichi

marries, and fathers a child by a young girl who had refused to be the novelist's mistress, thereby assuring her misery and his own reputation as a heterosexual. In the meantime, he entices former loves of the novelist into unconsummated affairs which amuse him to the degree that they are agonizing to the women. Nor is Yuichi any kinder to his male admirers. Once they are in love with him, he abandons them scornfully. The unrivaled belle of the ball, his conquests are never human beings to him, but merely witnesses to the fact that only he, in all the universe, has free will.

Only once is Yuichi's confidence shaken. Urged on by the novelist and by his own cruelty, he decides to witness the birth of his child. However, the reality of his wife's agony, and her gratitude for his presence, make him suddenly ashamed. He is confronted with the fact that her suffering flesh is of the same substance as his own. Next, the dramatic emergence of the child awes him. He is shocked at his joy that the child is a girl and cannot inherit his mentality. Finally, his unexpected love for the child awakens a sense of oneness with its mother. The narrator observes that Narcissus, who had till that moment lived only to be seen, was for the first time seeing. But such an experience is too threatening for Narcissus. His sense of godhead endangered, he flees the hospital for the homosexual bar where he reigns as supreme icon.

Now, it must be observed that none of Mishima's egoists is ever the least bit happy. In Mishima's vision, only the selfless have any capacity for happiness, although the wicked rarely allow them to enjoy that blessed state for long. Bored, envious and lonely, Yuichi and Etsuko are the most wretched members of their circles, and others of Mishima's characters are wretched in proportion as they resemble these.

Not all of Mishima's novels are about such desperate cases, and in fact several are concerned with characters who are as remarkably happy and good as Etsuko and Yuichi are wicked and miserable. His tender idyll, *The Sound of Waves*, takes place on a remote island, far removed from corrupting modern influences. There an indigent young fisherman, who has never even seen a movie, falls in love with the daughter of the owner of a fishing fleet. The girl's father has a wealthy candidate for her hand, but she refuses to marry anyone but the hero. The father forbids their seeing each other, then hires the boy to go on a long fishing expedition. The boat runs into a storm, but the young man's courage and quick thinking save the day. The father acknowledges the hero's worth, approves the marriage, and makes

the happy couple his heirs. There is more to this fairy-tale ending than "boy gets girl," however. In the course of his ordeal at sea, the young man has discovered his own capacities and strength of will. He does not feel that fate, or the girl's prayers, or the father's kindness have brought about his change of fortune, but himself alone. In *The Sound of Waves*, the hero triumphs because he deserves to; he deserves to because he stands for traditional virtues and values.

It should be plain, even from such brief summaries, that Mishima's vision of life was simplistic. Just this lack of complexity and objectivity made him fall short of the greatness he aspired to, for he was a master of lively incident and characterization. He never understood that people might accept modern thought because they thought it probable or true; he never admitted that anyone could live by it without becoming altogether depraved. Democracy, individualism, nihilism, rationalism, materialism: all were one to him, variant names for a single willful evil. The world, as he saw it, still offered plentiful opportunity for meaning, beauty, joy and purpose, all of which contemporary man rejects because they threaten to cut his ego down to size. I don't mean to imply that Mishima was naive enough to suppose that evil had been invented in the 20th or even the 18th century. But he did seem convinced that in the past it had been kept on the defensive by the force of religious and social sanctions, and that since modern philosophy had weakened those sanctions and provided a rationale for egoistic self-assertion, it had grown ever more militant and threatened now to overwhelm the world. This notion has some basis in reality; Mishima's folly was that he tried to make it explain too much. Dostoevski, who also detested modern nihilism, never doubted the sincerity of those who succumbed, never pretended that the world is not wicked enough to inspire any number of pessimistic philosophies. If Dostoevski also believed that beyond the reality of evil was a transcendent good capable of redeeming life, he never denied that life needed redeeming. Mishima attributes evil too lightly to the bad thoughts and deeds of misguided individuals, products of a society which has surrendered its traditional values.

No doubt, some of this difference between Dostoevski and Mishima can be attributed to the traditions in which they were raised. Christianity posits a fallen world and fallen man, and assumes that the individual deprived of religious hope is doomed to Hell in this life as well as the next. Japanese religion posits a world essentially supportive and harmonious and promises eventual redemption for all.

Buddhism lays the blame for suffering and evil squarely upon the ego, and all its disciplines are directed toward the taming and transcending of self-interest. Even Mishima's characteristic use of metaphors of *seeing* and *looking* is traditional, the mirror being a supreme symbol in both Buddhism and Shintoism. The man who studies *himself* in the mirror is in a state of mortal error. But the redeemed soul *becomes* a mirror, a clear mirror that reflects back the true beauty of the world without distortion. Still, Dostoevski's breadth of mind cannot be credited to Christianity, which has supported many a shallow thinker. And Mishima's rigidity cannot be blamed on Buddhism, which is capable of inspiring the broadest speculations. The crucial determinants lay elsewhere.

Mishima was born into an old samurai family, was given traditional ethical training, and attended the special educational institutions established for the sons of peers. That this training affected him deeply is beyond doubt, but it might have happened otherwise. His slightly older contemporary, Osamu Dazai, came from a similar background but rebelled against it, sank into an agony of self-loathing, drugs, abortive revolution and despair, that culminated in his early suicide. This wretched career, however, produced novels far superior to any of Mishima's. During the war, Dazai kept himself alive in the hope of seeing Japan destroyed, whereas young Mishima yearned only to die for his Emperor and his nation. Unquestionably, Mishima's childhood had been far more supportive than Dazai's, for Dazai's parents were almost incredibly heartless, giving the child away for adoption at his birth, demanding him back when he proved to be a prodigy, disowning him again when he did not turn out to their liking. But Mishima must have had an inspiring boyhood, to have looked back to the past ever after with such nostalgia, devotion and idealization.

The traditional Japanese ethic in which he was raised was based on an organic structure of mutual obligations and loyalties within the family and within the state, with everyone assigned to a functional place. This Confucian model was similar to the idea of the Great Chain of Being in pre-modern European social thought. But the Japanese tradition also emphasized the perfectability of the self, physically as well as spiritually, to a far greater degree than in either Europe or China. The Japanese "way" called for a continual challenging of the self, encouraging such odd customs as sleeping on the floor instead of in a proper bed, waking on winter nights to shower in ice water, practicing music sitting out in cold winds, going barefoot in all sorts of weather. Such austerities were intended

to encourage the dominion of spirit, but they were equally meant to toughen and cultivate the body. The Japanese have never despised the flesh or found its needs humiliating. But they required that, like the spirit, the body be educated and disciplined. So educated, spirit and body were both beautiful and good. Undisciplined, they were both vulnerable to weakness and temptation. Japanese Buddhism and Bushido concurred in holding these rather Greek ideas to be self-evident, and Mishima seems never to have doubted them.

However, the Japanese ideal is not quite Greek after all, and the difference is a crucial one. The classical Greeks cultivated body and *mind*; the Japanese cultivated body and *spirit*. The Japanese has never been an intellectual, but a man of faith, mountain-moving faith, and a man of sentiment, which has often had to stand as a surrogate for morality. For all his brilliance, and for all his fascination with modern ideologies, Mishima was not an intellectual and his response to ideas was primarily emotional. He did not concur or dispute; he loved or hated. In his long autobiographical essay, *Sun and Steel*, he characterizes the abstracting intellect as a force destructive to emo-

tional health and social institutions. He declares himself a man of body and spirit.

Mishima saw the loss of such traditional attitudes as a calamity, and the society which had emerged from that loss as a mere aggregate of solitary beasts of prey. He could imagine no form of social rebirth that was not based upon their restoration. Mishima was no mere chauvinist. He had a deep reverence for much foreign art and thought. He was especially drawn to Greece, lived there for a time, and translated the classical drama into Japanese. He studied Western languages and literature, built himself a Mediterranean villa and furnished it with English antiques. His clothes, his tastes, his friends, were frequently Western. Obviously, he was not interested in returning to the letter of his native tradition, but to what he regarded as its spirit. Obviously, too, the aspects of the Western tradition which most appealed to him were those which had most in common with certain traditional Japanese ways. Mishima recognized the striking affinities between the Archaic Greek and the traditional Japanese ideals. And the Elizabethan ideal of the gentleman,

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proud, honorable, active, cultivated, spiritual yet worldly, had obvious parallels with the Japanese aristocratic ideal. This ideal, for very solid historical reasons, was thoroughly mixed up in his mind with the military virtues. The Japanese gentleman of his idealized yesterday was, after all, a samurai.

In an interview with Edward P. Morgan a few months before his death, Mishima tried to clarify his position and his attitudes. It was a revival of Japanese "spirit" and ethics that he was concerned with, not of particular institutions, and absolutely not of expansionist overseas imperialism. He felt personally humiliated by what he considered Japan's present "effeminate" image in the world, as a "nation of flower arrangers"; a revival of more "masculine" and military virtues would be the best possible corrective. It is doubtful that Mishima was practicing hypocrisy or subterfuge in this interview, however it might have sounded to a foreigner remembering World War II. Mishima might well have pointed to himself as an example of what he had in mind. He had spent years at karate to build his physique, but was not known to have ever used it to maim anyone. He had spent years at kendo, but was not known ever to have used the sword to kill, until he later killed himself. He might also have had in mind the example of the Tokugawa Shogunate, which for nearly three centuries preceding the 1860s had provided unbroken peace, order and cultural progress under military rule. I can't be sure how he might have responded to the obvious objection that the world, and especially Japan, had changed radically since Tokugawa days, and that what might have worked then could hardly be expected to work now. But he might well have said that the change had been mainly for the worse and one must at least try for a restoration, however poor the chances. Mishima seemed to have been blind or indifferent to the failures of the Tokugawa period, just as he was blind or indifferent to the dangers of a military ethic in the modern world—for evil was something he associated too simply with the ideas he opposed. Nor could he seriously consider the Socialist alternative to rampant individualism, for socialism, with its idealization of the common man, seemed to him utterly opposed to aspiration, personal cultivation and transcendence.

But there is more to it than that. In the year that has passed since his death, the dangers he saw menacing Japan have worsened. China has emerged from its isolation and the United States has radically declined in power and prestige. Japan now stands on the edge of East Asia, confronting her traditional enemies, Russia and China, both of which are

vastly superior in population, size, strategic position and natural resources. Both of these nations are now seated on the U.N. Security Council; both have atomic weapons; both have a grudge against Japan because of past defeats in war, because of its present economic power, because of its special relationship to the United States. At the same time, the protection promised by the United States seems less and less credible. American economic difficulties are giving rise to policies damaging to Japan. The Vietnamese disaster brings into question America's future capacity or willingness to protect Japan militarily. Japan now stands isolated in the world as well as in Asia, with no allies besides the United States, geographically vulnerable, disarmed, unable to count on its patron for defense. At the moment, Japan's destiny seems utterly out of its own hands. It must rely on the good will and peaceful intentions of its powerful continental neighbors, or at least on the continuation of their rivalries. Both Russia and China are openly hostile to the "economic imperialism" by which Japan makes its living. Both are vehemently opposed to Japanese rearmament. Mishima saw this situation in the making, and slew himself

in the cause of Japanese rearmament and autonomy; it may be said that his behavior was inappropriate, but it cannot be said that the threat was illusory.

Mishima's immolation, then, was an act that took place in a historical context. He died a martyr to what he conceived of as the cause of Japan's survival and the rebirth of its traditional sense of self-respect and self-reliance. But that he so conceived of the act did not mean that the world would take it at his own valuation. As he knew himself, Japan had already discarded the system of values which once might have made such an act meaningful and inspiring. He was a ludicrous anachronism to the assembled young soldiers who mocked his passionate exhortation in the moments before his death. In spite of all, Mishima clung to the faith which those archaic values had taught him: that the spirit can overcome all evil and all opposition. It is impossible to say whether his death represented an assertion of faith that his vision must eventually prevail, or an expression of despair at the realization that it would not. In either case, like the burning of the Golden Pavilion, it may be recognized as an act at once wanton and reverent. □

What Diotima Taught

THE PLEASURES OF PHILOSOPHY.
Edited by Charles Frankel. W. W. Norton & Co. 341 pp. \$8.95.

MARTIN LEBOWITZ

Mr. Lebowitz has contributed to The Journal of Philosophy, The Kenyon Review and other publications, and to two anthologies: The Critics' Notebook (University of Minnesota Press) and The Kenyon Critics (World).

Charles Frankel's latest volume—apparently designed to serve as an introduction to the subject—is an anthology whose diversity of content expresses the pluralistic outlook of contemporary thought and feeling. Indeed, the editor of this volume is concerned as much with the motives that inspire philosophical systems as with the criteria that determine their truth, tracing the motives for philosophizing as far back as Plato's *Symposium*. His personal concern as an anthologist appears in part to confirm the sentiments of the pragmatists and relativists he liberally cites, saying, for example, that William James thought of pragmatism "as a way of choosing between ideas from the view of their life-enhancing effects." (The relativism inherent in absolute idealism is evident not only in

Royce's view of the philosopher as, in Frankel's phrase, the articulator of the ideals of his society, but also in Royce's belief that "old doctrines [are] true . . . because the new doctrines seemingly oppose, but actually complete them. . . . All aspects . . . contain truth.") Thus the central and seminal achievement of John Dewey, reflecting as it does the parallel influences of pragmatism and idealism, might be said to reveal historicism, the historical consciousness, as the common background of both (somewhat as, in the analytic psychology of Jung, the concept of motivation as expressing "archetypes" is essentially comparable to the categories of the Freudian system). Indeed, the philosophy of Dewey, so vital to Frankel's own intellectual development, would appear to preside symbolically over the compilation of this anthology.

On the other hand, Santayana is here represented by a famous passage in which he says:

No judgment could well be shallower . . . than that which condemns a great religion for not being faithful to that local and partial impulse which may first have launched it into the world.

In addition, Frankel's catholicity of judgment is such that he cites an essay in

which Charles Peirce, the founding father of pragmatism, argues for the exclusive and incontestable objectivity of scientific knowledge. Peirce is of course equally famous for his belief, somewhat ambiguously expressed, that truth is in essence whatever the scientific community chooses, in its collective wisdom, to regard as true—an attitude that Santayana might have viewed as expressing the dangerously voluntaristic (i.e., egotistical) outlook of modern life and society. Peirce's remarkable essay, "The Fixation of Belief," is noteworthy, indeed, for its argument against the possibility or need of first—or inherently indubitable—principles, on the one hand, and, on the other, that "there are real things whose characters are entirely independent of our opinions about them . . . [about which] we can ascertain . . . the one true conclusion." A crucial epistemological difficulty is contained in the question whether Peirce's point of view is self-contradictory. The selection of this essay

DROWNING

*From this distance, the shore
shows up as a heart attack
& each abutted fist of reef
geometry you want to be
yourself. Are you ever alone
at sea? What is close enough
to touch? The stroke you have
called a kiss flails in a break-
neck pace that includes no one,
a rhythm of panic you can't
keep up for brothers or wives
or the history you suspect
is flowing between your lips.*

*You remember learning to swim
by taste: the father you knew
would drown you, you tried
to climb with your teeth.
Unfried & held up for one quick
breath, the flesh exploded
in your mouth. When his blood
became the lines of your throat,
you were taught to live inside
a shout & to trust that life
as fact.*

*Off the impossible
coast of Lagos, you recall
the calmness of the dead man's
float, but even that is work.
The jerking in your chest
is not a shape you recognize
or want. If only you could stand
by yourself! You imagine a darkness
at the bottom of some ocean
that is really black.*

Michael R. Ryan

shows the anthologist performing the critical task of revealing the innate ambiguity of philosophical issues.

The passages selected from David Hume's *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* are accompanied by Frankel's remark that Hume is the "intellectual conscience of modern philosophy." Now, Royce's belief that new doctrines "complete" old ones is nowhere more suggestive than in the paradoxical relation between rationalism and empiricism. For the Cartesian dictum—the principle that all the things which we very clearly and distinctly conceive are true—has made a dilemma of the question what it is that we think we clearly conceive (or perceive): is it ideas, principles, objects or sensations, and what are the criteria of their clarity? In this sense the dispute between rationalism and empiricism, considered retrospectively, is the source of the idealist and conventionalist—or pragmatist—preoccupations of modern philosophy, including the philosophy of Whitehead. Indeed, the "dialectic" of the relation of rationalism and empiricism is such that, in the work of Carnap, for example, rationalism and idealism both appear to emanate from a properly skeptical empiricism.

Current philosophical controversy is reflected in Friedrich Waismann's brilliant essay, "How I See Philosophy," originally published in 1956. Waismann's view, not unlike that of Nietzsche and the pragmatists, is that:

At the heart of any philosophy worth the name is vision. . . . Insight cannot be lodged in a theorem, and this is the deeper reason why the deductive method is doomed to fail: insight cannot be demonstrated by proof.

In addition to recalling Plato and the Greek belief in myth and in *theoria*—voluntaristic aspects, perhaps, of the religious consciousness—this passage reminds us that it has become a commonplace of contemporary thought that no two philosophers are capable of essential agreement. That is, the issue whether philosophy depends on vision or on deductive proof may ultimately hinge on a definition of terms. Waismann's view expresses nothing so much as the failure of systematic philosophy in our time.

Frankel includes three dialogues by Bishop Berkeley for the sake of presenting a religious argument in the context of a paradoxical and, in its time, highly original metaphysics. Samuel Johnson is reported by Boswell to have claimed to refute Berkeley's position by violently kicking a stone. Now Berkeley's metaphysical doctrine is, in essence, that we never perceive objects or material things but only ideas that ultimately exist in the

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mind of God. Thus it is usually supposed that Dr. Johnson missed the point. Yet, in fact, the direct apprehension of solidity, of solid objects, is not an illusion but a perfectly normal aspect of perception. True, Berkeley or the psychologists might contend that the perception of material objects is a result of mentally correlating certain previous and "truer" perceptions. Nevertheless, to say that either a prior or subsequent perception is "truer" is obviously to beg the question.

Charles Frankel, Old Dominion Pro-

fessor of Philosophy and Public Affairs at Columbia, and a former Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs, has written extensively on philosophy, education and public issues. In *The Pleasures of Philosophy*, he has edited an outstanding book: a fascinating, though relatively brief, anthology for the student and general reader, explicitly directed to current concerns and attitudes. His comments on the authors represented are exemplary—brilliant, incisive, and illuminating. □

such as, let us say, the acidity of some of Bentley's atypical notes to his edition of *Paradise Lost*, we begin asking ourselves, as we recover from the shock, awkward questions such as: What are the relative magnitudes of Bentley and Milton? How far did the former get toward even beginning to understand what the latter was trying to do? More and more often, as we move forward through Fruman's painstaking volume, we find ourselves asking in the same way, and with a kind of bewilderment: How much has this critic ever understood of what Coleridge's words and sentences mean?

It is because of the answer I anticipate to this question that I doubt whether a book I should rather like to see will ever in fact be written. I mean one which would accord Fruman's advocacy the kind of treatment advocacy normally does receive in the forensic setting where it belongs: re-examination by counsel for the defense followed by impartial comment from the bench. For example, on the issue of plagiarism, the author builds up an elaborately documented argument to show, first, that Coleridge borrowed practically the whole of his dynamic philosophy from Schelling without adequate acknowledgment, and second, that such acknowledgments as he does appear to make are insincerely and skillfully designed to exaggerate the importance of his own contribution and minimize that of Schelling and all other thinkers. I should like to hear him asked how it came about that the references with which he supports this argument include a quotation from the *Biographia Literaria* which ends exactly where the following sentence begins:

God forbid! that I should be suspected of a wish to enter into a rivalry with Schelling for the honours so unequivocally his right, not only as a great and original genius, but as the founder of the PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE, and as the most successful improver of the Dynamic System which, begun by Bruno, was reintroduced (in a more philosophical form, and freed from all its impurities and visionary accompaniments) by KANT; in whom it was the native and necessary growth of his own system.

And there would be some other questions of the same sort.

But I do not think such a systematic defense of Coleridge will ever be written. For one thing it would be insufferably tedious to compile. But there is, as I have said, another and securer reason for the probable immunity of Coleridge, *The Damaged Archangel* from detailed criticism. To challenge a response, a verbal attack must come within the category of the answerable. Did any admirer of Milton ever get as far as actually

Abysses of Incomprehension

COLERIDGE, THE DAMAGED ARCH-ANGEL. By Norman Fruman. George Braziller. 607 pp. \$12.50.

OWEN BARFIELD

Mr. Barfield's most recent book is *What Coleridge Thought* (Wesleyan University Press).

The broad stream of Coleridge criticism has always been characterized by the appearance in it from time to time of single eddies of quite startling hatred. Dr. Norman Fruman's book is the latest and perhaps the largest of these. It is true he assures us at the close of his Introduction that he both began and ended his lengthy study "with profound respect and a sense of deep personal affection" for his subject; but we know from his own analysis of Coleridge's personality that hatred and a number of other unlovely impulses determining behavior are "not necessarily conscious," and we must be allowed to draw our own conclusions from what he says and not from what he says about what he says. As an instance of the latter, he hopes (he tells us) that his readers will end with the same profound respect and deep affection; as an example of the former, just 2 pages from the end he quotes from the *Letters* the sentence: "his mind is so very vile a mind—so oozy, hypocritical, praise-mad, canting, envious, concupiscent," and adds:

At no point in this severe but insightful analysis of Richardson did it occur to Coleridge that he might also be analyzing himself and thus be a deserving object of the anger and contempt so often visited upon him in his dreams.

Coleridge, The Damaged Archangel is a thorough, well-written and well-documented book, whose 573 pages (130 of them notes) plus an index afford the reader a full opportunity of judging both Coleridge and its author for himself. Provided of course that he is a reasonably

alert reader; for it must be added that both the manner and the procedure adopted throughout are those of a well-briefed, skillful and not overscrupulous advocate cross-examining a hostile witness. There is the same pouncing upon every utterance, however casual, ever let drop by the accused, the same liberal use of adverbs and superlatives to supplement argument with persuasion, and the same conscientious anxiety to omit no possible unpleasant insinuation however speculative.

Naturally the old issue of plagiarism receives a good deal of attention, and here the author goes a good deal further than most of his predecessors. For he seeks to persuade us that Coleridge was not only an inveterate borrower, not only a vain, mean and dishonest concealer of the fact of his borrowing, but was also a moderately well-read man masquerading as a very learned one, and a shallow thinker masquerading as a deep one. Of the two, it was Wordsworth who, besides being the greater poet, was the better critic and the more profound philosopher. Coleridge's admirers, it is argued, have followed one another like sheep in the shadow of his "prestige," which was itself never founded on anything more substantial than his own conceited claims to it. But if we will only think for ourselves, under Fruman's guidance, we shall perceive that most of his critical principles and most, if not all, of his philosophy is either parrot cry or pretentious nonsense.

Thoroughpaced iconoclasm always sounds impressive on its first impact and, when it is spread over 573 pages, it necessarily pretends to be formidable. But there is a danger in it; for the very sharpness of the conflict with traditional opinion is apt to invoke comparisons. "Atypical" is how Fruman describes his own point of view. Inevitably, when we have been startled by a critical phenomenon

answering Bentley, I wonder? Of Coleridge's psychology and his distinction between imagination and fancy Fruman has this to say:

... Coleridge, most of the time, was simply a child of faculty psychology, who altogether ignored Schelling's statement, "The essence of the soul is one. There are no faculties—these are assumed by a false psychological abstraction."

What is there to say? One could, I suppose, begin at the very beginning by gently pointing out that to distinguish is not the same as to divide; but it would clearly be a waste of time, since Coleridge himself has pointed it out so often, and evidently without getting through. Of his epistemology and its relation to science we are told that Coleridge "was

unaware of the elementary fact that modern science is based on a structure of quantitative relations." What sort of opening does this leave for intelligible criticism? One might perhaps brusquely affirm that Coleridge expended his best energies in striving to arrest the prevalent reduction of all knowledge to abstractions and quantities, and that he expressly demanded a science of qualities as well. One could hardly hope to succeed in explaining. For where would be the point of entry? How would one begin to criticize a book on Marxism that contained the sentence: "Marx was unaware of the elementary fact that modern society is based on capitalism"? The answer is that one never would begin. There are abysses of incomprehension which are their own protection. □

SUICIDE

*Late night in comfort rides
Over the city. Windowed lights
Fail, eyes close, and your
Room echoes with what
You left: your books and anger and
A newspaper picture of a nightstick
Smashing down on your upraised face.
You from another country speak
Of justice and sweet reason. Tell me:
Where do I send these things?*

Rich Messer

The Home-Grown Product

THE MAKING OF A RADICAL: A Political Autobiography. By Scott Nearing. Harper & Row. 308 pp. \$6. Paper \$2.45.

H. R. WOLF

Mr. Wolf is an associate professor of English at the State University of New York (Buffalo).

Of all genres, autobiography leads most directly to the center of recent literary speculations: Can any reporting of experience be nonfictive? Can the self, however sincerely presented, escape making a deal with artifice? Scott Nearing's *The Making of a Radical* lets us weigh both sides of the issue.

In the terms suggested by "new" fiction (Barth, Gass, Pynchon) and self-constructors (Mailer), we would have to say that Scott Nearing shapes a self by excluding Romantic and Modern subjective performances of the self presented in dream, memory, reverie (the confessional line from Wordsworth to Sylvia Plath), and including only data pertaining to his Socialist project. The fictive assertion of *The Making of a Radical* is the implicit denial of symbol, analogy and metaphor as controlling elements in making and constituting a self.

Having agreed finally, at 89, to write an autobiography (uncommon patience in this age of instant, and disposable, self-advertisements), Scott Nearing has set down his truth without self-conscious artifice. Within the frame of self-history, Nearing writes with the directness of Ben Franklin, the moral clarity of Tolstoy (his culture-hero), and the conviction of an Eastern sage—he is, in more than one way, a contemporary

Thoreau, or Emerson. In almost every way imaginable to me, Nearing's life has been exemplary: his expulsion as an assistant professor of economics at the University of Pennsylvania in 1915 at the age of 34 for his strong stand against the exploitation of child labor; his trial for "conspiring" to subvert the war in 1918 through a pamphlet, *The Great Madness* (which ended in an acquittal for him); his excommunication from the Communist Party in 1930, after three years' membership, for challenging in his *The Twilight of Empire* the orthodoxy of Lenin's "Imperialism."

These acts of integrity set standards. His research and travel all over the world in pursuit of information bearing on economic and political issues, and his experiments in self-sufficient, life-supportive living described in *The Maple Sugar Book* (1950) and *Living the Good Life* (1954) could serve as a radical's model of social responsibility. (It is ironic to think that these two books which have had the greatest social impact on contemporary youth culture through the models they have provided for the commune and intentional community movement, should chart that part of Nearing's life which represents his leave-taking from broad social experience and "Western civilization.")

At one point in *The Making of a Radical*, Nearing states his credo: "I became a pacifist, a vegetarian, and a socialist." To this triad of beliefs he has remained constant. His pacifism is clearly and simply defined: "I will try to persuade my fellow humans, but I will not harm or kill them." This issue is at

the very center of the problem of Nearing's autobiography, perhaps of his radicalism. How does he square his pacifism with his joining the Communist Party? With his encomiums on the Soviet Union and China (as late as 1960)? With his affiliation with the Conference on Solidarity with Cuba? In general, how does he deal with the question of radicalism and violence? Nearing devotes only a page to this issue and says ambiguously, "I am not an orthodox Marxist."

Perhaps the question is not *Angst*-ridden for Nearing because his ideology is essentially pastoral, a characteristic that reflects his beginnings in Morris Run Creek, Pa., his formative years at Arden (circa 1905), a Georgist-Socialist community, and his coming to a measure of rest first in Vermont and then "on the rugged, rockbound coast of Maine." Nevertheless, we must ask if the costs of revolution can accurately be estimated in a green world, in an Edenic counter-environment.

Returning to the matter of autobiography, even within the framed space of Nearing's true-to-life story, metaphors of organic development shape his attitudes toward diet, toward moral, social, and cosmic evolution (this biological and social progressivism is very much in the 19th-century mode). It is precisely a metaphor of natural politics—the processes of becoming and unfolding—that lies behind Scott Nearing's pastoral socialism. Metaphors of innocence have made and broken, in different ways, many American radicals and radical writers. Nearing's own expulsion from the mainstream gives the lie, in one sense, to that pastoral creed.

In the end, Scott Nearing is a home-grown product. Willing and unwilling exiles often have a special love for

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their homeland, a special desire to irrigate the taproots. Nearing has devoted nearly a century to the cultivation of harmony between man and man, man and nature. He is a New England Socialist. In writing about himself, he reveals a historical legacy of great value—almost in proportion to its ambiguous and problematic tenets. □

Men of War

THE LIONHEADS. By Josiah Bunting. George Braziller. 213 pp. \$5.95.

JAMES FINN

Mr. Finn is editor of Worldview.

I do not like being moved: for the will is excited; and action/Is a most dangerous thing; I tremble for something factitious;/Some malpractice of heart and illegitimate process;/We're so prone to these things, with our terrible notions of duty.

This quotation from A. H. Clough appears as an epigraph to *The Quiet American*, Graham Greene's novel about the war in Indochina which was published in 1955. Not about the war itself, of course, but about people who live in the midst of the war, people for whom the war is an ever present background to their own immediate desires, fears, loyalties, lusts and loves, and whose lives are often distorted or destroyed by that war.

A sizable number of works of fiction has been written about Vietnam since 1955, and some of them are quite good, performing their appointed tasks of persuading, provoking, obscuring, distorting. Only now, however, are we beginning to get those imaginative transcriptions of the war's reality which relate the taste and feel and smell of that war to the lives of the ordinary people involved. *The Lionheads* is among the best of these books.

When Greene wrote his novel his characters were, appropriately enough, Vietnamese, French, English and American. But the war has changed since then and Major Bunting concentrates on the American military as they variously respond to what Clough called "our terrible notions of duty." In the spring of 1968, Gen. George Lemming of the Twelfth Division wants to produce the body counts that will tell him and his commanding officers that plans are being followed and commands executed properly. Col. George Robertson, something of an aesthete, something of a misfit, and commander of one of the division's three brigades, has been especially warned that

he must jack up his unsatisfactory body count if he wants to keep his job:

Colonel Robertson knows . . . that he will be relieved unless he achieves a good body-count based on a major contact, and though he hates Lemming he knows the General can ruin him, can keep him from being a general, keep him from riding through Persepolis, can make it difficult to keep paying his son's tuition at Cornell, can keep him from commanding a division himself some day, can vindicate his own wife's hatred for what he has been doing with his professional life, can make him a retired colonel selling fire insurance, with a Legion of Merit in his buttonhole. Can ruin him. The prospect is discomfiting even to George Robertson.


As the discomfiture so economically established here is worked out, it involves a descending order of command reaching down to the 19-year-old Pfc. Paul Compella, newly arrived in Vietnam and due to have a fatal bullet lodge in his head during the sweep conducted by units under Colonel Robertson's command and counted a qualified success. The ambitions and partial visions of the men involved, their frustrations and cross-purposes emerge clearly as the men follow in their different ways the terrible notions of duty—and of self-interest.

War novels are almost a special genre, with their own rules, expectations and clichés. It is a great merit of this book that it so nearly avoids all the dangers with which the special genre is booby-trapped. It avoids almost entirely the high emotional scene, detailed descriptions of the suffering and destruction of this war, and the obvious spectrum of geographical, ethnic, religious and intellectual types that are thrown together in the army. A clean, cool intellectual light plays over the novel, revealing the structure of the military system, the impersonality of military training, the absurdity of the professional jargon and the significance of abstract, technical reports. This achievement, which is inseparable from the author's style, keeps the reader at some emotional distance from the action so that when he does arrive at judgments of the events and characters he feels them to be securely founded.

I realize that this description may make *The Lionheads* sound antiseptic and only mildly interesting. It is not. The novel evokes the mixed qualities both of the American soldier and the American military system as they appear under the moral and political conditions of the quagmire of Vietnam. It is more revealing and more moving than most of the high rhetoric in which we are daily drenched. It is a work of wit and compassion. □

Crossword Puzzle No. 1446

FRANK W. LEWIS



ACROSS

- 1 A person, supposing that a point goes to assigned positions, should show signs of them. (14)
- 9 Obtained property in a Baltic island? (7)
- 10 Possibly the care of this could imply one isn't the fair type. (7)
- 11 and 5 down One might be available to figure out for you he doesn't really tell tales out in the open. (6,10)
- 12 Cuts short what might be shortened less often than the thoroughbred type. (8)
- 14 1 across might be, as I would in the race, perhaps. (7)
- 15 One object of knavish thievery you (by the sound of it) discover in Russia. (5)
- 17 Just try to write one! (5)
- 19 Not used in genuine circumstances, but the urban type is an issue. (7)
- 21 What a realistic reporter writes, or an exact version thereof. (4,4)
- 23 A light bracket for a little science, at one time. (6)
- 25 One is probably not experienced with water falling in a driving position. (7)
- 26 Against being around the edges, when rather bloody in color. (7)
- 27 Old-fashioned movie making might help the company get "Hair" produced. (14)

DOWN

- 1 Orders of the old director of 27 passed through this. (9)
- 2 Outstanding reason for stand-up din-

ners? (7)

- 3 The brittle quality of brief French nimbleness? (9)
- 4 and 8 down Possibly misreads words for swords? (8)
- 5 See 11 across
- 6 Not active as a form of 25, without the first two vowels. (5)
- 7 Would having a more distinctive flavor be relatively silly? (7)
- 8 See 4 down
- 13 The order of the ant lion, more im- properly *Tr. European*. (10)
- 15 Does one set up an urban howl? (4,5)
- 16 Relative, with any around fifty being somewhat dirty. (9)
- 18 On the Bosphorus, the tail of a rabbit has a peculiar air. (7)
- 20 Makes somewhat of a row because of a broken spinule. (5,2)
- 21 Carry a small child to some point? (4)
- 22 Perhaps a once popular boat. (5)
- 24 The come-back of a nymph? (4)

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
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
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